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ABSTRACT 
This thesis documents and analyses patterns associated with international bonds issued by 
Norwegian firms and compares them with patterns of domestic bond issuances. The analysis 
is focused towards characteristics and features at firm level. The analysis is based on 
empirical data from the recent period of 1998 – 2008 in order to encourage and guide future 
research. Three particularly noticeable patterns have been found: (1) The firms which issue 
bonds internationally have very different characteristics compared to the firms issuing only 
domestically. Firms issuing internationally have a significantly larger amount of assets, higher 
profitability, higher level of investment and ability to service debt. (2) Despite the link 
between firms doing business abroad and issuing bonds abroad, the shipping and fishfarming 
industries appear to be more attracted to the prominent and renowned features of the 
Norwegian domestic market. (3) Only 3 of the 25 banks underwriting domestic issues are 
responsible for underwriting Norwegian bonds internationally. This indicates that the 
recognition of the underwriter is as important as the recognition of the firm. These findings 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Capital markets are the centre stage for firms aiming to raise capital. With the progressive 
state of globalization, capital markets are constantly evolving by integrating nations and their 
domestic markets and by creating a larger international marketplace with greater possibilities. 
The securities, corporate activity and market dynamics surrounding the new capital markets 
need to be fully investigated in order to understand how the evolution and patterns of 
globalization are affecting them. 
Because of the ever increasing selection of securities and capital vehicles, the available 
choices for raising capital are becoming more and more complex. However, studies show that 
the most utilized and valued way of raising capital is through issuing debt. J.C Gozzi et al 
(2010) show that approximately 81% of all capital raising is done through debt. 35 % of this 
is issued abroad.  For corporations, the main type of debt is through bonds. While securities 
bearing status as equity has been a hot topic for a long time, the focus and research around 
corporate bonds and issuance of debt has surprisingly, to date, been a fairly uncovered topic.   
Norway is a small country in the scheme of capital markets, domestic corporate markets and 
domestic demand. It is not a part of a commonwealth such as the European Union (EU), 
although it is part of the Schengen Agreement (EØS) which forces it to follow trade 
regulations from the EU. It has a large wealth from its oil and natural resources, making it one 
of the richest countries in terms of wealth per capita. Owing to its small population, the 
majority of its industries are capital intensive and few are large scale international. However, 
the firms that are large are world-leaders within their industry. These industries are mainly Oil 
and Gas, Energy and Utility, and Shipping and Fishfarming.  
The aim of this thesis is to research the patterns of bond issuances in the international market 
by Norwegian firms. The focus is at the firm level, looking specifically for differences 
between firms issuing bonds abroad, and firms not doing so. In order to obtain a better 
understanding of the results, the analysis covers additionally some aggregated patterns as well 
as surrounding factors which may play a part. Furthermore, the thesis uses theories from 
recognized literature in order to provide plausible explanations for the patterns.  
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1.1 LIMITATIONS 
Since this is a fairly undocumented area of research there are many interesting aspects which 
could be examined. Unfortunately, the amount of data accessible within the available time-
frame has limited the extent of possible analysis.  
The first limitation arose from a natural aspect. Because the Norwegian bonds market is 
relatively small, especially in terms of international issues, statistical significant results of a 
full analysis of aggregated patterns are difficult to achieve. This is a common problem for 
many smaller markets and, in other research, Norway is often placed in accumulated groups 
because of its small representation. For this reason this thesis has focused on the firm level.  
Acquiring available data proved to be more complex than at first anticipated. Obtaining 
access to or getting hold of historical data such as credit ratings, financial income statements 
and international bond data required a significant amount of effort. Owing to access problems, 
some of the data had to be manually retrieved by external consultants and banks. Some data 
was simply unavailable thus limiting the extent of the analysis. This was especially a problem 
when trying to get hold of the less recognized firms’ credit ratings. 
When determining the direction of the analysis the scale of the project and problems related to 
accessing and collecting data were important factors. The most central findings in this thesis 
are the firm characteristics and their coefficients. Ideally it would have been interesting to 
perform further analysis from this basis. Two possible alternatives were (a) to examine the 
differences between the firms before and after the first international issuance, or (b) to 
compare the characteristics of firms issuing equity.  Unfortunately, owing to the limited time 
frame and obstacles in accessing data, these further analyses were deemed too extensive to 
pursue. 
Many of the individual theories which support the theoretical views described in this thesis 
also illustrate and test the resulting outcome from the presence of these theoretical views. The 
effects are for example lower yields, higher underwriting prices, etc. This thesis does not aim 
to prove these effects, but rather acknowledges them.  The intention of adding them to the 
description of the theories is to provide an intuitive explanation of the patterns found in the 
thesis and to show the importance of uncovering their presence. An overall intention with this 
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thesis is that the patterns and findings will help to encourage more detailed research on 
patterns and effects of Norwegian firms issuing bonds. 
1.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Firstly, relevant theoretical views accumulated from various research publications are 
presented in Part 2. Most of the articles are published after 2000, and the majority very 
recently. The theories are therefore up to date and built on recent evidence. These theoretical 
views provide the basis of the discussion in part 6, where they are linked and matched with 
the results.  
The Norwegian market and background information relating to Norway’s corporate, industrial 
and bond market features are presented in Part 3. The intention is to give the reader a general 
awareness of local features and characteristics which are idiosyncratic for the Norwegian 
market, in order to obtain a better understanding of the analysis and the subsequent reasoning.  
Part 4 describes how the database was created, which sources were used and further 
complications and decisions made prior to the analysis.  
The analysis in Part 5 commences with the aggregated level and is followed by the industrial 
and firm level. The final sections explain the surrounding factors of exchange rates, credit 
rating and the choice of underwriter. 
 Part 6 discusses the relation between the existing theoretical views from Part 2 and the 
analysis results in Part 5.  
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2. THEORIES – WHAT AFFECTS THE CHOICE OF ISSUANCE? 
There are several different theories and beliefs as to why companies issue bonds in 
international and domestic markets. This analysis does not aim to test or formulate theoretical 
hypothesizes, but rather to document patterns of issuances and relate them to existing theories 
that explain them. This part aims therefore to introduce and describe potential theories of what 
affects the choices of issuance. Potential links between these theories and the patterns found 
in section 5, will be discussed in section 6.  
2.1 THE LITERATURE 
The literature on raising capital is mostly related to raising equity. However, the processes 
and mechanisms that exist when issuing equity are fairly similar to those of issuing debt. The 
theories describing equity are therefore also to some extent compatible and applied for issuing 
debt. 
A large part of the literature directly related to debt issuance tends to focus on the investor’s 
point of view. The definition of an attractive market for the investor may often be at the 
expense of the firm, and vice versa. But they have also common interests, and are basically 
mutually dependent upon each other. The investor wants, and presumably seeks, to invest his 
free cash flow, and the firm needs to raise capital. In this sense they are financially 
complementariness. Intuitively, the theories of the investor’s behavior should therefore to a 
large extent coincide with the firm’s behavior.   
2.2 MARKET SEGMENTATION VIEW 
The Market Segmentation view is an accumulation of empirical analyses and theories which 
try to explain potential differences in markets that makes them independent or segmented. It is 
often linked to various biases and barriers. In a domestic market the possibilities of 
segmentation may exist as different preferences towards firms listed on the main stock 
exchange opposed to the alternative OTC exchanges. In international markets there is a wider 
range of market characteristics that may isolate markets. These may be within 
macroeconomics, market structures or legal frameworks. The main concept of this view is that 
the factors driving the segmentation in markets prevent the capital markets in functioning 
efficiently.  
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As long as there is trade across markets with that have different jurisdiction, structural 
distinctions will exist. The question is whether these dissimilarities are significant enough to 
make a difference. Firms issuing debt in a segmented market may suffer from the restrictions 
and conditions that limit it. Issuing in a different market may therefore prove to be a better 
solution of escaping them.  
The biases that create segmented markets have a more natural origin. The segmentation 
through bias leans more towards market clustering of products and interests. This is more of 
an international trait since an intra-national cluster of similar production would seem fairly 
normal. They may affect the market in the same ways, but unlike barriers they don’t restrict 
capital markets. A usual assimilation for this bias is specialization of markets. 
The main focus of the literature dedicated to segmentation of capital markets is based on the 
investor’s point of view. In 1988 the World Bank surveyed 125 institutional investors from 16 
different countries with a view to improve debt issuance and trading
1
. The survey found that 
liquidity, investor base and trading convenience were the three most valued attributes. Despite 
corporations having slightly alternative interests than investors, it seems fairly intuitive that 
the existence of these attributes also would create a more advantageous arena for firms issuing 
debt.  
Most of the developed countries and markets are known to have fewer investment barriers 
which help encourage international flow of capital and investors. They are therefore 
considered to be more integrated. Less developed, small, or emerging markets are, on the 
other hand, known to have self-imposed barriers such as limits on FDI or tax regulations, as 
well as barriers caused by lack of legal framework, poor accounting systems and lack of 
information.  
There are different levels of segmentation. This is usually proportionate to how far the 
country has come in developing their monetary system and economical structure. Factors 
affecting the risk premium and bond spread may differ between markets. Antzoulatos (2000) 
found that liquidity has a large impact on determining the emerging market bond spreads. In 
addition H. Min, Lee, M. Nam, Park and S. Nam (2003) found that liquidity as well as 
solvency problems determine a great deal of the bond spreads in emerging markets.  They 
also discovered that macroeconomic factors such as inflation rate, terms of trade real 
                                                          
1
 “Mobilizing Private Savings for Development: IBRD and the Capital Markets”, by Kenneth G. Lay, 1994 
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exchange rate, and net foreign assets play a large part in the difference of cross country yield 
spreads. Being indicators of national risk they affect the creditworthiness related to the 
country which, in turn, affects the firms. Firms in such countries may, therefore, be subject to 
increased cost of debt by having to compensate for the risk investors take. Though a portion 
of investors seek the higher returns that come with these markets, many are often prohibited 
from accessing them either because of other market barriers, or simply because the risks are 
too high.  
This theory offers two potential reasons for companies looking to issue debt abroad. The first 
one is to avoid fluctuating legal systems, poor accounting systems, regulations, taxes and 
illiquid domestic markets which either crave risk premiums for existing investors or simply 
discourage investors from entering the market. The second is to exploit specialized markets 
that have investors with the same market or production interests as the firm’s.  
2.3 INVESTOR RECOGNITION 
Like any product that needs to be sold, the product or brand’s recognition among buyers is an 
important attribute. Recognition, or awareness, among buyer and investor will in most cases 
mean an increase in demand. With an increase in demand, the product may get sold or even 
achieve a better price. This reasoning also applies to bonds - the investor who is familiar with 
or recognizes the firm will most likely accept a lower risk premium or compensation, than the 
investor who doesn’t have any knowledge of the firm. 
Another important factor in creating the demand is the pool of investors wanting to invest. 
Since bonds are of a certain magnitude, a larger pool of investors is therefore needed to cover 
the amount issued. For smaller markets, there may be a problem in having a large enough 
pool of interested investors - especially if the issue size is large. This may force the firm to 
lower its offering price or increase the yield, which increases the issuers’ cost of debt. An 
alternative is to issue the bonds in international markets were the pool of investors is large 
enough to create a sufficient demand and therefore keep the cost of debt down. However, in 
the international market, smaller firms may not be recognized by the investors, which again 
would mean an increase the cost of debt, in order to compensate for an increase in perceived 
risk. 
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So far the reasoning has been intuitively based on common economic mechanisms. There are 
several articles that argue and debate the topic on how the firm’s recognition affects the cost 
associated with issuing debt in multiple or international markets. Merton (1987) argues that 
the issuing firm’s cost of capital is lower when a larger proportion of the investors recognizes, 
or is familiar with, the firm and its operations. His argument suggests that large firms that do 
business in international markets, and are therefore more recognized, may achieve lower cost 
of capital by issuing in international markets. Puthenpurackal (2001) found that the 
international issuance’s at-issue yields and underwriting costs are 12 to 15 basis points lower 
than the domestic issuances. However, Tawatnunchai and Yaman (2008) find that the overall 
cost of issuing internationally is approximately the same as for domestic firms. They measure 
the overall cost by adding the indirect costs of change in stock value to the direct costs of the 
issuance. They do, however, find that the majority of firm that choose to issue abroad, have 
good reputations 
There appears to be are mixed beliefs concerning the total lower cost of issuing in 
international markets. However, the literature seems to agree that firm recognition and 
awareness among investors is a vital feature to issuing bonds successfully in the international 
market.  
2.4 BONDING VIEW  
The bonding view is an accumulation of theories which aim to challenge the ownership, 
control and governance of the corporations.  One theory is that bondholders may be affected 
by the extent of rules and regulations limiting the open market for corporate control. 
Corporate control is meant as the market for takeovers. The idea is that few barriers for 
corporate control reduces the managerial preference for a “quiet life”, and enhances 
profitability and firm value. (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). This reasoning assumes that 
the market for corporate control is a market in which managers compete for the privilege to 
manage a firm’s resources (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The theory is, however, 
somewhat unclear as to how bondholders view this governance mechanism. Bondholders may 
benefit from increase of firm value, but with the change in risk often associated with 
takeovers, their wealth may go in either direction (Billett, King and Mauer, 2004; Warga and 
Welch 1993). 
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From a corporation’s view point, the majority and most recognized capital structure models 
project maximization of shareholders wealth. However, research increasingly recognizes 
potential theories and models projecting managers’ self-interest deciding the capital structure. 
These do not necessarily coincide with the optimizing of shareholder wealth. Though the self-
interest may be related to various issues, the matter of interest here is related to the findings of 
Garvey and Hanka (1999), which suggested that managers issue debt depending on the 
protection their firms are subject to. They found that while protected companies reduce their 
use of debt, unprotected firms do the opposite. This is in-line with the findings of Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2003) and supports more recent research suggesting managers use excess 
debt to avoid the threat of hostile takeovers.  
Recently Qiu and Yu (2009) suggested that bondholders react negatively to a restraining of 
the market for corporate control.  This was based on empirical evidence suggesting an 
increase in cost of debt after the passing of the US’s business combination (BC) laws, which 
raised the cost of takeovers. This was, however, found only to apply to firms in non-
competitive industries, and for firms rated with speculative grade (BB or lower). This would 
suggest that bondholders are more afraid of the increased risk of bad managerial governance 
rather than the added risk of leverage-increasing takeovers. This seems a fairly intuitive 
choice as a potential takeover may offer better results than worsening the managerial 
governance of a firm already considered to be at a large risk of default.   
Another theory which plays a part in the bonding view and which is a contrast to an open 
market for corporate control, is the effect of having large and controlling owners. The issue is 
directly linked to the private benefits of control. The meaning of private benefits covers 
company resources captured by a controlling shareholder and using it to his/her own benefit. 
It may range from extensive use of executives’ perks and deviations from “fair” prices of 
assets, to inside information directly related to the firm’s business.  
The controlling party will naturally initiate such extraction when it is difficult to prove.  
Private benefits are, therefore, difficult to measure. Dyck and Zingales (2004) use two 
methods related to the difference in stock values, and the price difference between voting 
rights and their strategic role. Having a controlling party is a characteristic most often found 
in less developed economies. The evidence varies therefore a good deal. Dyck and Zingales 
found that legal and institutional mechanisms play an important part in limiting private 
benefits – especially tax enforcement and media pressure. This also seems intuitive since the 
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more developed countries have more experienced and stronger legislation and monitoring of 
ownership and fraud.  
The ownership control’s effect on debt and bonds is well documented. The general factors 
affected are ratings and yield spread. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) documented lower yields 
and higher ratings for firms with larger institutional ownership. Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
found that family controlled firms have significant advantage in yield spreads than non-family 
firms. The reasoning is that families don’t diversify to the same extent, and are therefore more 
concerned and protective of the firm. More risky projects are therefore more easily turned 
down, which again reduces the risks related to holding the bonds, and hence a lower yield 
spread. Furthermore, Ashbaugh et al. (2006) found that firm ratings are negatively related to 
shareholder rights, CEO also acting as the Chief of the board, and ownership control.  
These analyses are all based on the US domestic market and can therefore not be generalized 
for other markets. They do, though, represent plausible theories.  
Recently Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) tested a hypothesis of whether ultimate owners with 
voting rights and cash-flow rights would threaten the interest of bondholders through 
investing in less or non-profitable projects. Using a mixture of developed and developing 
markets, their evidence showed that family control gives a increasing effect on bond yields 
and a negative effect on ratings. This is contradictory to the findings of Anderson and Reeb 
(2003). Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) also found that control of widely held financial firms 
only has an effect on the ratings, while State control has no effect on either of the two. Their 
reasoning was that families in controlling positions are more likely to extract private benefits 
that harm the debt holders’ interest. Also, since the owners are less likely to dilute their 
control when raising capital, they are more likely to use debt financing.  
Their analysis also tested the effect of investor protection on debt and bonds. They showed 
that better bondholder protection generally reduces the bond yields and increases corporate 
bond ratings. This is in line with the findings of Dyck and Zingales (2004) which have been 
mentioned earlier. However, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) went even further and suggested 
that the protection is related to the enforcement of debt law being more important than simply 
the existence of book law. In effect, their conclusion runs in favor of issuing in more 
developed countries which tend to have more controlling agencies and institutions.   
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A solution often appearing in the bonding view’s theories, is to issue internationally. One idea 
suggests issuing debt in foreign markets and internationalizing as a way for firms to bind 
themselves to better corporate governance frameworks, which theoretically increases the 
firm’s protection against corporate takeovers. Another suggests that issuing abroad in more 
developed markets should lessen the fear of insufficient legal protection for the bondholders. 
The potential outcomes are shortly summarized as; limitation of negative effects on 
bondholder’s risk and wealth, inefficient governance, and exploitation of private benefits that 
otherwise would increase the cost of debt for the corporation and bondholders. 
2.5 HEDGING CURRENCY RISK  
If a company receives cash flows or income in different currencies than their domestic 
currency, they are exposed to exchange rate risk. A common way to deal with this is to issue 
debt in foreign markets and or denominated in the currencies which they expect to receive the 
cash flows and income in. This is a method called straight hedging, and offsets the risk of a 
fluctuating value of the underlying. Another alternative is cross-hedging, which implies that 
the firm issues debt denominated in currencies that is correlated with the underlying cash 
flow’s currency. When hedging with debt, it is important to notice that issuing debt only 
provides a suitable hedge for revenues. For many firms that do business abroad, an equally 
important factor is the costs that materialize. Issuing debt to hedge the cost, however, only 
increases the exposure towards the currency rather than decrease it. 
Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) found strong evidence that debt issuance in foreign currency is 
related to foreign activity. Furthermore, they showed that the significance of this factor is 
consistent with foreign debt playing the role as a hedging instrument. In the results they found 
evidence of both straight and cross hedging. Also Elliott, Huffmann and Makar (2003) found 
a strong relationship between the exposure to foreign currency and the level of foreign-
denominated debt for US multinational firms. Additionally, they found that the foreign 
denominated debt is negatively correlated with foreign denominated derivates. This supports 
the evidence that the debt is used for hedging purposes. 
Firms that have international relations, either through production, export or investments 
abroad are known to hedge their cash flows denominated in foreign currency.  The method of 
hedging cash flows and income has through times varied somewhat, owing to different types 
of financial vehicles evolving and a constantly increasing globalization of business. Elliott, 
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Huffmann and Makar (2003) find that due to a large quantity of derivatives used in the end of 
the century, foreign denominated debt is increasing as the popular vehicle to hedge with. But 
hedging the cash flows with bonds in a foreign denominated currency does not dictate the 
choice of market. The currency market is like most other capital markets globalizing at and 
equally fast pace. In large marketplaces like London Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, it is 
common that firms issue bonds denominated in a wide variety of currencies. The most 

















                                                          
2
 Tawatnuntachai and Yaman, “why do firms issue global bonds” (2008) 
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3.  THE NORWEGIAN MARKET  
Norway is both a small and a fairly young nation in the world market. It does, however, have 
several distinctive features that make it different from other nations. Starting off by going 
back to the first issued bond should help to emphasize the importance of government 
involvement in the corporate ownership and governance. This part aims to give an overall 
illustration of the Norwegian industries, bond market and the government’s role in the 
corporate market. 
3.1 HISTORY OF BONDS 
The first bond issued in Norway was by the Norwegian state in 1820, six years after the 
country’s independence. It was issued in Berlin, but owing to high interest and administration 
costs, it was regarded as a national disgrace. Most bonds between this period and WWI were 
either issued by the Norwegian government or by the state bank, Kongeriket Norges 
Hypotekbank, which was established in 1851. Until 1920 the bonds issued were mainly 
characterized by extremely long-term maturity lasting 20 – 60 years. Most of the government 
bonds were issued on European markets, while the Hypotekbank issued most of its bonds on 
the domestic stock exchange in Oslo. In the pre-WWI period money was pegged to the metals 
silver and gold. This meant that there was relatively low or no volatility between currencies
3
. 
Government bonds were therefore issued in multi-currencies. The coupons of bonds 
denominated in Norwegian Kroner from the Hypotekbank were also paid out in Swedish and 
Danish Kroner. The bond markets in Europe were thriving, with a second-hand market much 
larger and more liquid than the issue market. The mean yield differentials for Norwegian 
bonds in Europe were very low, indicating trends today associated with an efficient market. 
Europe was therefore considered as one market. 
During the period between the world wars a lot changed in the bond markets which caused 
increased fluctuations in the currency exchange rates. This implied that the multicurrency 
bonds issued by the Norwegian government had different yields and prices depending on 
currency. Bondholders wanted their coupons to be in appreciated currencies, thus creating 
arbitrage situations. In the 1930’s a new legislation was introduced which prevented the flow 
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of bond capital across borders. This made the strong international bond market turn more 
towards domestic issuances. Government bonds soon dominated the Oslo Stock Exchange 
and were denominated in NOK.
4
 It was also in this period that the Norwegian market first 
started attracting private corporate bonds. Initially they started off small, financing building 
projects and mortgage loans. As they proved successful the issuances increased both in 
amount and size. 
WWII caused the bond market activity in Norway to shrink noticeably. Most of the remaining 
bonds issued were the government’s bonds financing the Wehrmacht claims.  
The period from the end of WWII until 1979 was dominated by the ruling and regulations of 
the authorities. The interest rate started at 2.5 percent in 1946 when the newly issued bonds 
were basically controlled for both amount and price. Despite increasing market pressure the 
interest rate was administratively fixed, only changing 6 times up until 1979
5
. There were, 
however, certain changes in this period especially concerning the corporate bonds. The credit 
enterprises experienced a large increase in activity and, despite quotas restricting their bond 
financing, these institutions consolidated their importance. Also, the government approved the 
first industrial companies to issue bonds. These approvals were mainly granted for purposes 
that were favoured by the authorities – mainly export-orientated manufacturing companies or 
projects associated with electricity.  
In 1980 the government turned on their strict monetary policies and started a deregulation 
process of credit markets. The bond market was largely affected by dismantling control of 
new issues and bond investment requirements for financial intermediaries. At the end of the 
decade the control measures were removed from the market and returned to the normality of 
50 years earlier
6
.     
The reaction led to many new issues driven by both credit enterprises and private industrial 
companies. The issues were often small, which resulted in infrequent trading once released on 
the second-hand market. With the market regulations normalized and credit flowing more 
                                                          
4
 Chapter 5 – “three busts and booms involving banking crisis in Norway”, Karsten R. Gerdup Norges-bank.no 
referenced; Feb 2010 
   
5
 Chapter 4, “bond markets and bond yields in Norway”, Jan T.Klovland, Norges-Bank.no, referenced; Feb 2010 
6
 “Shaken or Stirred? Financial Deregulation and the Monetary Transmission in Norway”, G.Bårdsen and Jan T. 
Klovland,(2000) 
Page | 21  
 
freely and rapidly, the loan portfolios eventually revealed a lot of bad loans. Restructuring the 
debt became a problem, causing failure for many lead credit enterprises. Many of the 
survivors ended up with bad credit ratings. On the industrial side, the stock market crash of 
1989 became a worldwide phenomenon affecting Norwegian industry which was very 
dependent on export. With the high interest rates starting to fall at the end of the 1980’s, many 
bond issues were called. From 1990 there was a vast reduction in private bond issues to just 
above 20 for credit enterprises and 10 for industrials
7
. 
3.2 CENTRAL INDUSTRIES 
Most of Norway’s wealth comes from exports and imports, where the main export products 
are refined primary resources. On the top of the list is the export of oil and gas. Discovered in 
the late 1960s, oil and gas gave Norway a large boost in its economy and development. Most 
of the oil and gas extracted from the Norwegian reservoirs is exported. In 2010 it accounts for 
50% of all exports and 34% of the government’s revenues. Norway is also the fifth largest 
provider of oil and the third largest of gas in the world
8
. The experience and technology which 
followed the extraction has also given rise to the growth and development of Norwegian 
companies in the supporting fields of oil extraction such as oil exploration, subsea operations 
and drilling.  
Norway is one of the world’s leading countries when it comes to hydroelectric power. It 
produces in total 4 times the amount of energy it needs
9
, with hydroelectric power covering 
almost the whole domestic demand. Because the production of hydropower cannot be stored, 
it has a seasonal trend for both consumption and production. However, the net export is 
normally positive, with European countries as the main buyers
10
. The dams and waterways 
experienced a building boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since then the expansion has 
been strictly regulated. These dams and hydro plants are in most cases owned by the local 
government, but governed as individual firms
11
.  
Norwegian Shipping has its roots all the way back to the Viking Age. Having been among the 
leading countries in innovating ship technology and maritime law, Norway is today major 
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league player in the international market. The figures for 2001 show that the Norwegian 
shipping industry was the 3
rd
 largest shipping nation in the world, and transporting 10% of the 
world’s tonnage.
12
. This is also an industry where the firms have been founded by 
entrepreneurs and families rather than the government.  It is also one of the larger industries in 
Norway that is not based on primary resources. 
Norwegian salmon is the country’s second largest export product. Norway is a world leader in 
fishery and fishfarming. Like shipping, this is also an industry mainly built by entrepreneurs 
rather than the government.     
3.3 THE GOVERNMENT’S CORPORATE INVOLVEMENT 
At first, Norway was mainly dominated by the primary sectors and the general population was 
poor. Because of this, the government has played a significant role in developing the nation’s 
business market and wealth. Lacking both prosperity and current resources, Norway was 
forced into the bonds market early, as already mentioned in section 3.1. It was, therefore, 
quite some time before secondary and tertiary sectors, being more capital intensive, became 
central contributors of GDP.  
Norwegian law states that an array of natural resources originating from Norwegian territory 
belongs to the government, and hence the common wealth of the Norwegian people.
13
 At the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century some of the wealthier families and merchants invested more 
significantly in business and created some of the larger corporations still existing today, such 
as Orkla, GC Rieber and Norsk Hydro. Except for Norsk Hydro, none of them extracted 
natural resources. Investing in the areas covered by the laws related to extraction of resources 
was dominated mainly by the government. This was not, however, unexpected. The law stated 
that any excess return made on the resources would pass to the state. The initial and 
investment costs were also extremely high. Many state-owned companies such as Norske 
Skogsindustrier, Statoil, Statkraft and local energy companies related to hydropower are 
examples of this. Apart from the corporations within natural resources, the state was also 
founder of amongst others Telenor, Kongsberg Gruppen and partially SAS.  
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The revolutionizing discovery of oil in the North Sea gave Norway a large upswing in wealth. 
As well as Statoil growing to become one of the world’s larger oil companies, the gains from 
taxes and royals from the oil was transferred to a sovereign fund, today called the 
“Oljefondet”. One of its investment strategies is to serve the Norwegian society as much as 
possible through investing in Norwegian companies.
14
 It must be noted that, though the fund 
is owned by the state, the ownership does not affect the governance or investments beyond the 
guidelines originally state in the fund’s purpose. This will be described in more detail later. 
By the beginning of the 21
st
 century the more liberal parliament decided that some state 
companies were starting to get so large that they were best governed as individual entities. 
Among the more known corporations affected were Statoil and Telenor. The new corporate 
structures had state-owned majorities of between 53% -68% with 32% - 49% publicly listed 
and the state assuming a more passive governance role.
 15
 This is also expressed in figure 1, 
where the green line does a sharp turn up 10% in 2001. The increase is due to the government 
owning large stakes in the newly listed large firms. 
 
Fig. 1. The development of ownership on the Norwegian Stock exchange. The figure shows the proportions of 
ownership in firms on Oslo Børs. Green: Central and local government, orange: Foreign investors, blue: private 
firms, pink: private investors, purple: mutual funds, grey: others. Source:VPS 
 
Since 1990’s and up until today the Norwegian government holds large positions in a lot of 
Norwegian listed companies. Examples are Norske Hydro, Yara International, Aker and 
Orkla. The government generally keeps a semi-passive ownership where they do not issue any 
specific security backing, nor do they directly affect the governance of the companies. Their 
involvement is mostly in terms of expressing expectations related to topics such as business 
moral issues and in ways of protecting Norwegian interests. This is also how they relate to the 
sovereign funds, which act as normal investors, but with guidelines.  
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Of the small amount of research that has been committed to discovering patterns in capital 
raising through debt, most of it has been towards the more liberal US and British markets. 
Both countries have quite different politics and constitutional frameworks from Norway. US 
corporations are dominated by private or public ownership, and post-Thatcher Britain has 
many of the same features. 
This section tries primarily to illustrate that the level of privatization in Norwegian 
corporations cannot be compared in full with the more open markets. While discarding firms 
due to state involvement does not largely affect the outcome in US, UK or other more liberal 
countries, discarding the same firms in Norway would drastically reduce the already small 
number of issuing firms. However, as long as the government only plays a passive ownership 
role in the firms, either through their own directives or through sovereign funds, the findings 
on firms in Norway may realistically be compared to other benchmarked countries.  
3.4 OSLO STOCK EXCHANGE 
Oslo Børs is the only Norwegian stock exchange where bonds are listed and traded. It is a 
small stock exchange in comparison to many of the large bourses and stock exchanges in 
Europe and the world. It holds a substantial selection of firms covering a considerable variety 
of sectors, and is often referred to as a stock exchange for commodities. However, over 50% 
of them are related to either Energy or Oil and Gas. It is also the world’s leading stock 




In order to attract a larger investor base and make Norwegian stocks and bonds more 
accessible, the stock exchange cooperates with the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG). 
This cooperation is fairly new (2009), and is a replacement of the previous contract with 
NASDAQ OMX. Through these networks the Oslo Børs shares members and trading systems 
with several other stock exchanges around the world. Oslo Børs has today 57 members, where 
33 of them are of international origin
17
. This shows the importance of the role which foreign 
investors play on the Norwegian market. 
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The traditional section of Oslo Børs is required to follow all directives from the European 
Commission (EC) owing to the agreement of European Economic Area (EEA). In 2006, the 
EC put new directives into effect requiring listed firms in Norway to use IFRS in their 
consolidated accounts
18
. As a reaction to this, Oslo Børs established the Alternative Bond 
Market, ABM, in 2005. This functioned as an unofficial market place organized and 
administrated by Oslo Børs in order to avoid the strict rules of the EC. In other words, it 
functioned like the traditional exchange, but adopted simplified application process and 
prospectus regulations
19
.   
3.5 BOND MARKET TODAY 
The Norwegian corporate bond market follows two main benchmarks for the domestic 
market. The first benchmark is the government bonds. With its large wealth as its backing, 
Norwegian government bonds are rated top of the class at all rating bureaus, and serves 
therefore as the benchmark for risk free investments. The second is the Nordic interbank 
offered rate, NIBOR, which projects the interbank rate on loans in the Nordic region. In terms 
of credit default swap rates there are only the iTraxx indices that cover Europe and Asia. They 
operate either as total market indices or specifically on industries. These second hand market 
rates do, to some extent, affect the issuing market. However, the iTraxx has Telenor as the 
only Norwegian firm, and has therefore a minimalistic influence on the domestic market.  
In order to set the correct price or yield on any bond being issued, the market must be large 
enough to be able to supply a sufficient amount of liquidity. This is a problem in Norway, as 
it is relatively small market. Compared to its neighbours, Sweden and Denmark are 
considered twice and four times larger, respectively. In an attempt to increase the liquidity, 
many of the government’s sovereign funds, such as “Folketrygdsfondet”, “Oljefondet” and 
“Pensjonsfondet” have instructions to do a certain amount of investments in the domestic 
market. An important feature in this strategy is that the funds are independent of the 
government and aims therefore to maximize their profits like any other investor. The fund 
“Folketrygdfondet” is one of the largest funds, holding 4.9 % of the total domestic 
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bondmarket. They hold 3.1% of the total corporate market, excluding the financial sector
20
. 
Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of bonds the fund holds. 
Historically, there are very few incidents of issuers defaulting on their debt. Despite this, only 
a minimum of the bonds issued are rated by the recognized rating agencies of Standard and 
Poor, Moody’s and Fitch. In fact, there are so few, that many databases choose not to collect 
the data on ratings. For international investors, portfolio managers and hedge fund managers 
that base large parts of their analysis on ratings, only a few firms stand a chance of being 
included in the portfolios. A normal assumption among investment banks is that if the firm or 
bond is not rated by Standard and poor, or Moody’s, it is considered non-rated
21
. There are, 




Dun & Bradstreet all produce ratings for the Norwegian market, but are less recognized and 
are often subjected to criticism for having a conflict of interest. For the banks, the ratings are 
largely used for their own and their clients’ use. Fortunately for the firms issuing bonds, 
investors don’t only look at ratings. As described under section 3.2, the Oslo bourse has a 
large proportion of international investment banks and investors, despite the few ratings
22
. 
Figure 3 illustrates the proportion of investor groups in the domestic market. 
                                                          
20
 Ftf.no, ”det norske obligasjonsmarkedet” 2009. 
 
21
 Source; DCM contact at Credit Agricole, Paris. 
9 
Ftf.no, ”det norske obligasjonsmarkedet” 2009 
Fig. 2. Investor groups in the Norwegian market. 
Source: nftf.no, VPS. 
Fig. 3. ”Folketrydfondet”’s domestic bond involvement.  
Illustrates the proportion in which the Sovereign fund 
has invested in the Norwegian bond market. Source: 
nftf.no, VPS 
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Norway and Norwegian bonds are ranked with the highest score for creditworthiness
23
. Every 
aspect of risk is calculated into the ratings of firms, including sovereign risk. With a national 
risk assessment at the top of the class, the ratings of Norwegian firms are therefore more 
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4. DATA – CONSTRUCTING A DATABASE 
Databases normally collect and hold only a limited array of data types. Being a small country, 
Norway is not noticeably represented in international databases and Norway’s own databases 
are fairly specialized and dedicated. The main categories of data tested in this thesis are 
related to bond issuances - both domestically and abroad, and to firm characteristics from 
financial income statements, currency rates, market indices and stock market values. 
This part aims to illustrate and describe the origin, criteria, characteristics, experienced 
problems and decisions made on the applied dataset. This part ends with a description of the 
literary sources for methods and empirical data with which the results in the analysis are 
compared. 
4.1 TIME FRAME 
The timeframe of the analysis is set to 1998 – 2008, and includes only bonds issued in this 
period.  This is in line with the intention of the thesis giving an empirical analysis based on 
recent historical activity. In addition, there were limitations on the available data from 
financial statements before 1998, and most Annual Reports for 2009 were not published at the 
time. A ten year aspect should suffice to empirically characterize the activity and patterns of 
today’s market. There have been both booms and busts in this period, and Norway was 
especially affected by the bank crisis of 2002-2003 and the recent international financial crisis 
of 2008. 
4.2 CRITERIA FOR FIRMS 
There are many firms and institutions that can issue bonds with various intentions and to 
cover different financing needs. Since this thesis focuses on the corporate bond market, the 
selection of bonds must be limited to firms that are somehow listed in the public market. This 
initially rules out all bonds issued by national, regional and local government and government 
agencies.  However, there have been made some exceptions owing to the positions and 
structure in the corporate ownership, which was explain in section 3.3. 
Investment institutions such as banks and funds, credit institutions and other real estate trusts 
as well as bonds that are mortgage-backed or other asset-backed were excluded from the 
dataset.  
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4.3 BOND ISSUANCE DATA 
The data on bond issuance in Norway is collected from the database of Norwegian Trustee 
Service, and covers all issuances registered with the Norwegian Central Securities Depository, 
VPS.  Norwegian companies are, by law, obliged to report any issuance of bonds to VPS. 
This law was put into action 1996, and applies therefore for the whole of the thesis’ time 
frame. Hence, the database should hold all domestic issues. 
The law obliging firms to report bond issuances does not apply for issuances in foreign 
markets. The data on international bond issues comes therefore from Thompson Reuters’ 
Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) New Issues Database. The database provides transaction-
level information on new issues of bonds with an original maturity longer than 1 year. For 
these reasons the dataset does not include debt with maturities shorter than this. 
The criteria for the data in SDC are Norwegian domicile, and exclusion of the macro 
industries Finance and Government. The search also excludes the bonds that are meant for the 
domestic market. There are also a fair amount of issuances listed in the domestic markets but 
which are denominated in foreign currencies. The bond data holds both public and private 
issues, convertible and non-convertible bonds, and fixed and floating rated bonds. 
4.4 DIVIDING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
Many of the domestic issues state that the target market is both Norway and Europe. Since 
bonds are listed in Norway and in the VPS, they are considered domestic issuances. Among 
the firms issuing debt abroad, a large portion also issue debt domestically. These firms are 
regarded as international issuing firms, and are not included in the domestic dataset, and 
therefore do not affect the patterns of the domestic issuers. By doing so the results will 
illustrate patterns for firms only issuing debt domestically, opposed to the firms issuing 
internationally. When it comes to subsidiaries and companies wholly or partially owned by 
Norwegian firms, they are considered independent firms. This is intuitive since the 
subsidiaries have separate management and accounts. Some of these are also of foreign origin. 
Examples are Kyvistar and Norske Skogsindustrier Canada. These are considered foreign 
firms, and therefore fail to meet the criteria for the Norwegian based dataset. 
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4.5 FINANCIAL INCOME STATEMENTS 
The firm level characteristics and figures form the largest dataset in the thesis. The main 
source for this data was the Bourse project from NHH. Though the database is mainly 
concentrated on stock and bond prices and indices from Oslo Stock Exchange, OSE, it also 
recently added the function of serving financial income data. The Financial income data 
covers all companies listed on the OSE. A problem was that many of the firms issuing bonds 
are small or medium firms not registered on the OSE. These are mostly firms that are traded 
OTC, and list their bonds on the Oslo Alternative bond market, ABM. As described earlier, 
this marketplace is an unofficial market place, and clears both EU directives regarding IFRS 
requirements. The result was a large quantity of missing data on several firms. So as not to 
lose any valuable observations, the missing values were filled in by acquiring the data from 
the databases of proff.no, ravninfo.no and published reports on various firm websites. 
Unfortunately, there were firms that still had significantly large amounts of data missing. 
These few firms were along with their bond data excluded from the data set. 
4.6 OUTLIERS AND CRITERIA FOR OBSERVATIONS 
Some of the industries in the dataset exposed to extreme and fluctuating capital intensiveness. 
A normalized cash flow may prove hard to sustain, which means the financial statements and 
key ratios fluctuate considerably. For example, the initial investment costs of oil exploration 
are very high. At the same time, the income is often connected to completion of contracts and 
projects, meaning that the time of income may be uncertain and arrive in large batches. For 
the dataset this means a large case of outliers and sudden changes. Normally, outliers would 
be removed so that the regression would not be biased by the observations. The Norwegian 
market, on the other hand, is especially exposed to industries with these characteristics. 
Removing outliers, and with it valuable information, would give a more unbiased mean. Since 
this is considered a normal property of the market, it is therefore appropriate to use the 
median as a more representative coefficient. Hence the effect of outliers is reduced and the 
information is still implemented into the analysis. 
4.7 EXCHANGE RATES 
Some of the financial income data is stated in US dollars, USD. Also the bonds issued abroad 
are denominated in foreign currencies. The SDC database which holds this information also 
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states the principal or tranche amount of the issue in USD. To be able to compare the amounts 
with domestic amounts in Norwegian Kroner, NOK, the USD is converted to NOK by the 
historic, daily averaged exchange rate given by the Central Bank of Norway. The list is found 
in Appendix 8.2 
4.8 CREDIT RATINGS 
Credit Ratings are an important part of the everyday bond market. The ratings of Standard and 
Poor, Moody’s and Fitch are fairly available through the SDC database used for international 
bond data. Historical credit ratings were, however, not easily available. The historical data 
used in the thesis, was found through access to a Bloomberg terminal. The choice of using 
Standard and Poor as the international agency was merely based on available data. The firms 
rated by S&P were also checked towards the ratings of Moody’s and Fitch. The result showed 
that they had the same firms and ratings.  
Unfortunately, acquiring the historical ratings from the less recognized rating agencies of Dun 
& Bradstreet and DnB NOR, required too much extensive work from the agencies and the 
data therefore became inaccessible to the thesis.  
Since there were very few observations of the Norwegian firm, the analysis was based on the 
few observations available and conversations with the bond departments at DnB NOR in Oslo 
and Credit Agricolé in Paris.  
4.9 SPECIFIC DECISIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
With the data from different sources over a ten year period, there were certain issues that 
needed to be addressed and decided upon. This section will quickly describe some of the 
limitations and decisions made in creating the dataset. 
Capex 
Capital expenditure is defined as expenditures that create future benefits. It is a good and 
widely used coefficient to represent the level of investment in a company. This figure is 
usually stated in the cash flow statement. However, this was not available for the majority of 
the firms. So as not to discard the Capex and the information it holds, the alternative was to 
calculate it instead using the following equation: 
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Capex = Change in total assets - Change in total liability
24
 
Size of issue 
When issuing a bond, there is a distinction between the available size of the issue and the 
actual size issued.  A bond contract usually has a maximum principal amount which the firm 
can issue.  A common method is for the firm to initially issue a so called tranché, with means 
a slice, of this maximum amount. Later the firm may issue several tranches until the 
maximum amount is reached. The question is: which amount is considered to be the size of 
the issue; the first tranché, the maximum principal amount, or the total amount of tranches 
issued?  This is an issue rarely defined or discussed in other papers. In this thesis the choice 
falls upon the first tranche. The reason for this is that the amount issued in the first tranche 
represents the firm’s choice of optimal amount to issue at that specific time. The maximum 
principal is often not issued at all. In that sense, each tranché should be considered a separate 
issue. Unfortunately, data on individual tranches issued after the initial one, was not available. 
The size of the bond issue is therefore represented by the first tranche. 
Changes and Differences in the definitions of accounting standards. 
Though International financial reporting standards, IFRS, and Statement of Financial income 
standards, SFAS, have brought the financial world closer together, there are still some 
differences. Most of the differences are found in either the basic layout of the financial 
reports, or in the definitions of the various posts.  
Using different databases, the issue of Operating Income seemed to differ. While some 
defined it as revenues or sales, others defined it as net operating income. In accordance with 
the majority of the dataset, the operating income is defined as revenue or sales. The net 
operating income data was therefore altered accordingly. 
There also seemed to be a difference in the definition of Equity. According to IFRS, the 
minority interest is a part of the equity. When defining the different firms’ equity, the majority 
of the data excluded the minority interest, while some included it. In 2007, the Financial 
accounting standard board, FASB, changed the status of minority interest from a liability to 
equity. The change therefore only applied to 2008 in the dataset. Since the majority of the 
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data considered minority interests as liability also for 2008, all the figures of 2008 were 
adjusted, defining minority interest as a liability. This was done with the intention to remove 
any bias in the equity figures from 2008. 
Changing of names 
Over a ten year period some firms changed ownership or names. This created a slight problem 
related to which firm issued which bonds. An example is Statoil, which has been registered 
with many names: “Statoil ASA” twice, before and after “StatoilHydro”, as well as “det 
norske oljeselskap”. The last name was originally used for Statoil when it was wholly owned 
by the government. Their new bonds also bore the name a while after they partially went 
public. The company is named Statoilhydro for the dataset, although the data includes both 
the time when it was Statoil as well as StatoilHydro.  Other companies have been through 
similar processes, and been treated equally. 
4.10 FINAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS AND FIRMS 
The finalized and total dataset consists of 412 domestic issuances and 73 international 
issuances. The total set comprises 124 firms, where 111 of them issue only domestically, and 
15 firms issue internationally. The firms are divided into 12 different industries. Figure 4 
illustrates how the firms are spread among the industries. The two largest industries are Oil 
and Gas and Energy and Utility, respectively representing 22.89% and 22.47%. The two least 
representative are Transportation and Fishery covering 1.03% and 0.82% , respectively. The 












Fig. 4. The proportion and number of industries represented in the dataset. 
Industry Number of issues Propotion of issues
Energy and Utility 109 22.47%
Fishery 4 0.82%
Food and Beverages 30 6.19%
Industry 53 10.93%
Oil and Gas 111 22.89%
Property 38 7.84%





Wholesale and Retail 13 2.68%
total 485
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4.11 OTHER EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
As mentioned earlier, there has be conducted very little research and literature that cover 
international issuance of debt. However, there are some fairly recent articles that have been 
published. These articles play an important part in this thesis as they represent benchmarks 
and provide an expectation for the results from this analysis on the Norwegian market. Some 
of the methods used in these articles are approximated in this thesis, in order to create 
compatible results for comparison.  
The following articles are described according to their content and in which way they are used 
in this thesis. Their results are compared and described sufficiently in the analysis, and will 
therefore not be described or illustrated in this section.  
4.11.1 “Patterns of international capital raisings”, by Gozzi et al (2010) 
The article was recently issued in the Journal for International Economics and focuses on the 
patterns of both equity and debt issuance in the international market versus the domestic 
market. It is based on firm level characteristics from several countries worldwide. Norway is 
represented, but only as an accumulated group of the small European countries. It seemed 
therefore appropriate to do a more detailed analysis of the Norwegian firms and use these 
worldwide patterns as benchmarks. Their time frame covers issuances from 1991 till 2005. 
Though there is a 3 year gap between this time frame and the one of this thesis, the results are 
still highly compatible. Many of the analytical methods from this article have also served as 
methods in this thesis.  
4.11.2 “Why do firms issue global bonds?” by Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2008) 
The article was published in the Journal of Managerial Finance in 2008, and focuses on 
motivations for firms issuing global bonds versus domestic bonds. There analysis is done on 
the US market alone, and covers the time frame of 1995 – 2001. Because the article’s time 
frame is quite different from the time frame of the thesis, it does not serve as an optimal 
benchmark. Also the firm level characteristics are more focused on issuance characteristics 
rather than the firms’ financial characteristics. Their results are, however, interesting in 
providing references and expectations. The article brings a lot of insight into this otherwise 
less covered topic, and several of the methods were useful as guidance.  
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5. THE ANALYSIS 
Having described the dataset and details concerning the Norwegian bond market, the focus 
now turns to the analysis. This part is organized so that the first sections analyses descriptive 
statistics on the aggregated features of bond issuances. The second part analyses the firm level 
characteristics and the final part analyses surrounding elements of issuing bonds. It is 
important to notice that for the sections sorted by issues, the data is divided by issuing market. 
This applies for section 5.1, 5.3 and 5.5. The sections sorted by firms, are however divided by 
the firms issuing abroad and domestically. This applies for section 5.2, 5.4, 5.6 and 5.7. To 
avoid disrupting the flow, the more detailed calculations can be found in the appendixes. .  
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE PATTERNS OF AGGREGATED BOND ISSUANCES 
Starting with the basics, figure 4 provides a descriptive graph and table of the aggregated size 
of bonds issued per year. The blue area shows the international issuance, and the red area the 
total amount issued. The red part is also an illustration of the domestic issuance. 
Fig. 5. Aggregate amount of bonds issued in million NOK. This figure shows the activity in terms of aggregation 
of issuance per year for both the international and the domestic issues.  Data are in 2008 Norwegian Kroner. 
The figure shows a fairly volatile evolution of bond issuances. While the domestic proportion 
seems steadily to increase, the international proportion varies considerable. The total amount 
issued peaks at 41 000 million NOK in 1998 and 58 600 million NOK in 2007. The years 
2000 and 2008 experience troughs, both with total issues only 10700 mil NOK. Figure 6 
shows these figures more precisely divided into international and domestic issues. 
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and 93% of the total amount, respectively. The levels are otherwise fairly varied and low for 
international issues. Domestic issues have a growing trend both in proportion to total bonds 
issued and in absolute amount. The peak is 2006-2007 where both years are close to 37150 
million NOK.  
Fig. 6. Amount of bonds issues 1998 – 2008 for international (blue) and domestic(red). Data are in 2008 
Norwegian Kroner. 
Fig. 7  Number of issues per year for international(blue) and domestic(red). The absolute number is illustrated in 
the graph while the relative amount of issues is listed in the adjacent table. While international levels fall 
permanently below 10 since 2000, domestic numbers increase steadily since 1999 and peak a year before the 
financial crisis in late 2007. 
Figure 7 shows that the trends are similar for both the number of issuances and the total 
amounts. 1998 and 1999 has the highest number of issues of 23 and 14, whilst it is 
considerably lower for the rest of the period. As for issuances domestically, there is a steady 
growth in the number of issues from the lowest number of 5 in 1999 to 2006 when there are 
85. Interesting for both international and domestic is the year of 2008, when the financial 
crisis hits the market. This year there were no international issuances at all, while the 
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amount. It’s also remarkable to see the reduction in international markets from 1999 till 2000, 
where the international issuances were reduced by 78% in number of issues and 81% of total 
amount.   
Gozzi et al (2010) found a continuous increase in international issuance worldwide. Their 
findings and international patterns do not coincide totally with the findings in figure 6. 
Looking at international issues, they found that the total amount issued steadily increased 
from 1998 – 2005 whereas the pattern in figure 6 seems to rise 3 times, but then fall 
drastically each time. Though the peaks of each rise are higher, there seem to be factors that 
make them collapse and the pattern therefore becomes more cyclical than continuous. This 
suggests that the patterns depicting worldwide activity do not fully coincide with the 
Norwegian activity. Intuitively, this also makes sense considering how national policies and 
events are limited to affect the country’s firms economically, e.g the Scandinavian bank crisis 
of 2002-2003. Also, the low number of issues observed in this thesis, compared to the 
worldwide analysis, makes the Norwegian pattern more sensitive and thus more volatile to 
small national events. Though this may also harm the analysis, it is also important information 
for the patterns of international issuance in the Norwegian market.   
The pattern for the domestically aggregated amount issued, illustrated figure 6, seems to 
coincide well with the patterns of capital raising in the developed countries Gozzi et al’s 
(2010) paper. They also find a steadily increasing amount issued through bonds. The pattern 
of the amount issued in the international market seems, however, to coincide better with the 
patterns of capital raising in the developing countries. They both project a small amount 
issued with a following high volatility. 
Summing up, firstly, despite having much fewer issuances, the international market has a 
generally high total amount issued. This suggests that the size of each issuance abroad is of a 
larger character than the domestic.   
Secondly, the favoured choice of market to issue bonds in appears to change dominance over 
the time period. The International market is clearly dominant in the start of the period 1998 – 
1999, issuing 86% and 97% of the total amount. From 2000 – 2002, however, the amount 
issued in both markets is fairly equal, and from 2003 – 2008 the domestic market is clearly 
the dominating market, with 85% of the amount issued in 2003 and 88% issued in 2005.  
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Finally, the radical change in issuance in 2007 and 2008, both internationally and 
domestically, suggests that the choice to issue bonds is very affected by macroeconomic 
factors. The Norwegian domestic business sector was not as strongly affected by the financial 
crisis as other countries like US and Euro countries. Issuance in the domestic market dropped 
from 78 issues to 30, and issuance in the international market dropped to from 7 to 0. Since 
there still were issues in the domestic market, this may suggest that the choice of international 
issuances is more sensitive to macroeconomic activity and conditions than the domestic 
market. However, it may also be a result of so few issues in the international market, in which 
there is no way to distinguish between the magnitude of the two markets’ reaction.  
5.2 FIRMS ACCESSING THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
The aggregate figures have so far depicted the main trends of issuing bonds, and provided a 
first insight as to how the activity in international and domestic issuance has performed over 
the given time period. They do not, however, explain the movements and activity at firm 
level. The next two sections will illustrate this more in detail. 
1998 10 63% 15 1.50 394 26%
1999 4 57% 4 1.00 183 18%
2000 12 80% 15 1.25 330 12%
2001 18 90% 25 1.39 351 10%
2002 8 73% 22 2.75 572 20%
2003 18 95% 26 1.44 410 47%
2004 27 84% 44 1.63 458 24%
2005 34 94% 68 2.00 369 9%
2006 56 97% 85 1.52 437 19%
2007 52 93% 78 1.50 477 13%
2008 16 100% 30 1.88 360 0%
Descriptive statistics of the firms' issuances
Number of 
issues
Average issue size 
relative to 
No. of firms 
issuing






Mean number of 
issues per firm
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of domestic firms’ representation. “% of firms issuing” is a percentage of the total 
amount of firms issuing in both markets. “No. of firms” includes the set of companies issuing abroad, given 
domestic issuance. Since the firm would represent both sides, it cancels itself out by representing both sides. The 
mean issue per firm is calculated from the aggregate sizes of columns 1 and 3. Average amount issued pr firm is 
the total amount issued divided by a weighted sum of issues. Column 6, the relative average issue sizes, are 
calculated by domestic numbers divided by the same for international. This illustrates the percentage difference 
between them.  All data is in 2008 NOK value.   
Looking at Table 1, the number of firms issuing domestically shows a steady increase 
throughout the whole period, peaking at 56 firms in 2006. The average number of issues per 
firm per year lies between 1 and 2, with one exception in 2003. The average size of a 
Page | 39  
 
domestic issue lies mainly in the range of 500 – 300 with only two outliers. These figures 
show that the average size is fairly stable which means it is unaffected by the increasing 
number of firms. There is therefore reason to believe that the aggregate total amount issued is 
mainly a result of added number of issues and not an increasing issue size.  
 
In table 2, the number of firms issuing internationally stays at a low level, with only 6 firms at 
their highest in 1998, falling to 1 as their lowest in 2003, and to 0 in 2008. With this the 
number of firms represent 38%, 3% and 0% of the total firms issuing for the respective years. 
The number of issues for 1998 and 1999 is especially high relative to the rest of the period. 
The reason for this is that StatoilHydro ASA alone issued 14 of the bonds in 1998 and 9 of the 
bonds in 1999. This makes the mean issues per firm for these two years biased. The average 
issue size varies between 3500 mill NOK and 1000 mill NOK, with only two outliers at 4109 
in 2005 to 877 in 2003.   
1998 6 38% 23 3.83 1493 4
1999 3 43% 14 4.67 1032 6
2000 3 20% 3 1.00 2655 8
2001 2 10% 2 1.00 3530 10
2002 3 27% 7 2.33 2914 5
2003 1 5% 3 3.00 877 2
2004 5 16% 9 1.80 1942 4
2005 2 6% 2 1.00 4109 11
2006 2 3% 3 1.50 2331 5
2007 4 7% 7 1.75 3574 7
2008 0 0% 0 0.00 0 0
Descriptive statistics of the firms' issuances






Mean number of 
issues per firm




No. of firms 
issuing
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of international firm set’s representation. Owing to few observations the “Average 
issue size” is manually checked for outliers which may bias the results. Average issue size is in mill NOK. Unlike 
the domestic figures, “the average issue size relative to domestic” is here given as the multiple, e.g. for 1998 the 
international size is 3 times larger.  All data is in 2008 NOK value.   
 
Comparing these two sets of statistics reveals that there are a few different patterns between 
the two markets. Firstly, issuing domestically is a preferred choice for the majority of the 
firms issuing bonds. This characteristic increases as the time period elapses. The international 
issues represent 38% of the firms in 1998 and 1999, but fall to a lowest point of 3% in 2006. 
This is mostly due to the great increase in domestic issues, while the international staying 
stable. The results contradict the patterns of Gozzi et al (2010) and Tawatnuntachai and 
Page | 40  
 
Yaman (2008), both of whom found a continuous increase in the trend of firms issuing 
internationally for the correlating periods.  
Secondly, the average issue size is much higher for international issuances. This confirms the 
findings in section 5.1. Apart from the extreme event year of 2008, the average issue size is at 
its largest in 2005 (11 times higher international issues sizes), and at its lowest in 2003 (twice 
the size of the average domestic issuance). This shows that there is a clear difference in the 
size of the issuances in these two markets. It is also in line with the expectations projected by 
both Gozzi et al (2009), and Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2008). 
 
5.3 BOND ISSUING PATTERNS SORTED FOR INDUSTRIES   
The results from the previous section showed that only a few firms are represented in the 
international market. Sorting the number of issues by industries, the spread is even smaller. 
The domestic market has all 12 industries represented, with the Energy and Utility sector most 
represented by 24.27%. In second and third place are Oil and gas, and Shipping, accounting 
for 16.99% and 15.53%, respectively. Figure 8 illustrates the proportion and number of issues 
for each industry.  
 
Fig. 8 The domestic proportion of issues sorted by industries. The column for domestic in the table states the 
number of issues in each industry.  
 
The international issues paint very different picture, however. Figure 9 illustrates the 
proportions of industries for internationally issuing firms. It shows that several of the 
industries issuing in the domestic market are not represented at all. These missing industries 
are Service, Shipping, Property, Wholesale and retail, and Transportation. Except for 
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Shipping and to some extent Service, these industries offer products or services that are more 
aimed at the domestic market. They are therefore not expected to do much exporting or other 
business in foreign markets.  The industries issuing bonds internationally are, on the other 
hand, more prone to be doing business abroad, either by exports or production itself
25
. The 
only exception is the Food and Beverage, which is solemnly represented by the Orkla ASA. It 
must be noted, that Orkla ASA does business in many different industries beside Food and 
Beverage. To what purpose these bonds are issued, is not stated in the issuing documents. As 
described in section 3.2, the domestic demand for some resources are much lower that the 
supply. These industries produce goods and services that contain a larger domestic supply 
than demand. To demonstrate, Statoil Hydro ASA is the world’s ninth largest producer of oil 
and gas and has installations all over the world, Telenor provides telecom solutions to 
Scandinavia, Eastern Europe and Asia, Norske skogsindustrier that are a world leading 
producer within pulp and paper products, and finally Yara International that is a world leader 
on fertilizer. Also, Norway and it’s energy producing firms export large amounts of electricity 
to Europe. Unfortunately, the amount of business each firm conducted over the period was not 
accessible. The amount of business is therefore assessed only at industry level.  
 
Fig. 9. The international proportion of issues sorted by industries. The column international states the number of 
bonds issued. 
 
Since the number of observations in international issues was low, there were only a limited 
amount of patterns at the industrial level. One of the exceptions was the Oil and gas industry, 
which number of issues in the international and domestic market seemed to be negatively 
correlated. While the international issues were high in the beginning of the time period, they 
stayed low from the year 2000 and ended up with 0 in the three last years, 2006 – 2008. The 
                                                          
25
 Ssb.no/di 
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domestic market, however, saw the opposite, staying low from 1998 – 2005 and ending up 
with high levels the years of 2006 -2008. The figures are found in appendix 8.3. 
 
It is an interest fact that the data holds no record of international issues in the shipping 
industry, while domestically it represents the third largest amount of issues. Even though the 
Norwegian shipping industry is a substantial participant in the world market, the firms seem 
to prefer list their bonds on the Norwegian market.   
 
Summing up, firstly, the patterns show that the industries issuing bonds abroad are dominated 
by firms that produce or deliver products that are known to have a larger supply than domestic 
demand. These are products with substantial demand internationally, which suggest the 
industries are more likely to do larger parts of its business abroad. Secondly, the Norwegian 
shipping industry prefers to issue bonds in the Norwegian market. The Oslo Stock exchange is 
said to be a large marketplace for shipping, which suggests that Norway’s reputation for 
shipping attracts foreign investors to the Norwegian market. This indicates that it is 
considered more advantageous for the shipping firms to issue bonds in, than issuing in foreign 
markets. 
 
5.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS - WHICH FIRMS ISSUE ABROAD 
This section turns the focus towards the characteristics of firms. The aim is to identify 
differences and patterns of the firms issuing abroad compared to the firms issuing only in the 
domestic market. In order to provide a clearer result of the characteristics of the two datasets, 
the firms that also issue abroad have been excluded from the domestic dataset. When 
comparing to the benchmarks, Gozzi et al’s (2010) patterns are referred to as the worldwide 
benchmark, while the patterns of Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2008) are referred to as the US 
benchmark. The section starts by explaining some specifics and methods concerning the 
testing process. It continues by analyzing each characteristic as well as the results of the 
median regression. Finally, there is a summing up the most important results.  
5.4.1 Specifics and methods  
The previous section uncovered the potential problem of the differing presence of industry 
sectors in the different markets. A quick glance at the firm-level data shows that there is a 
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large spread in the size of the characteristics which are largely related to affiliated industry. 
Comparing international issuing firms with the domestic’s may therefore create highly biased 
results. Using the median of the characteristics compensates for this by reducing the effect 
that outliers and extreme values would otherwise have on the mean. The mean was also 
calculated and found to be very biased when performing the tests. The data fails in many areas 
to fulfil the criteria for a normal distribution. Adding a fair amount of homoscedasticity due to 
different properties in the industries, the criteria for using Ordinary Least Squares are not met. 
A better solution is to use median regression, also known as quantile regression, since this is a 
non-parametric regression which focuses on the median rather than the mean. However, the 
issue of the variance in firm level characteristics still remains. To solve this, the variance, or 
standard errors, of the characteristics are bootstrapped with clustering at the firm level. The 
bootstrapping method is easier to use since the variance does not fit the classical method’s 
assumptions of normality. Theoretically, it is more flexible, yet it gives approximately the 
same results as classical methods of calculating the standard error. In the regressions 
performed here the number of iterations used was set to 100. Similar tests were done using 
Least Absolute deviation regression, which also focuses on the median rather than the mean, 
in order to check the robustness of the results. 
Throughout the quantile regressions, the international coefficient and statistics are conceived 
by using a dummy for all firms issuing abroad. It is important to note that the medians and 
coefficients representing the levels are in thousand NOK. The results from other articles that 
are compared are converted with the approximation to NOK described in 4.7. The results and 
coefficients stated in the following section are therefore in thousand NOK.  
The characteristic coefficients are all displayed in table 3. 
5.4.2 Characteristics 
Size 
To begin with, the domestic median size shows a modest 3 069 574, while the international 
median size is 28 000 500. Again, note that these figures are in thousand NOK. To be able to 
understand these sizes, it is natural to look at the benchmarks proclaimed earlier. Comparing 
the domestic issuing firms, Norwegian firms have a median three times smaller than 
worldwide estimates, but approximately the same as the US market. Also for the international 
dataset, there is a remarkable difference compared to the benchmarks, but slightly different 
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that the domestic. The Norwegian international median is 2.5 times larger than the worldwide 
estimate, and remarkably 8.5 times lower than the US firms issuing global bonds.  
Firms issuing bonds domestically (A) Firm's with issuing abroad (B)
Median Median Median regression
(No Observations) (no. Observations)
Size
Total Assets 3069574 28000500 25000000*** [51.95]
(799) (132)
Growth
Annual growth rate of total assets 9.92% 5.67% -4.245%* [-1.51]
(688) (117)
Investment
Capital expediture 48838 547140 497206***[22.08]
(686) (117)
Capital expediture/Sales 3.80% 6.52% 2.7215%*  [1.61]
(677) (107)
Profitability
Return on Equity 7.25% 12.43% 4.094%***[2.59]
(795) (107)
Capital Structure
Total debt/Total Assets 64.16% 61.21% -2.958%***[-2.03]
(795) (132)
Short-term debt/Total debt 30.19% 32.89% 3.056%  [0.62]
(795) (132)
Servicing Debt
Net income/Total debt 3.61% 5.76% 2.32%***[2.72]
(792) (132)
Net income/Short-term debt 10.71% 20.16% 9.1%***[3.24]
(789) (132)
Valuation
Tobin's q 1.390 1.560 0.17004***[3.17]
(528) (91)
Coefficient on difference with 




Table 3. Firm Characteristics. Medians (number of observations) for both international and domestic firm level 
characteristics, and differential coefficients. Both figures for Size and Investment are in thousand NOK. Total 
assets are book value total assets. Tobin’s q is defined as (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities + 
liquidating value of preferred stock + market value of equity)/Assets, similar to Miller and Puthenpurackal 
(2005). Firms not listed with market value of equity are excluded from the results. The median regression 
presents only the results from the international perspective. The numbers in brackets represent the t-values of the 
quantile regression.*,** and *** illustrate significance level at 10%,5% and 1%, respectively.      
The results suggest that it is mainly the largest firms that issue abroad. This is despite the US 
estimations being constituted 7 years prior to this time period. The coefficient of the 
difference between the domestic and international firm size is 25 000 000 and significant at 
1%. The result states that firms issuing bonds abroad are much larger than the domestic 
issuing firms. The result is a confirmation of the expectations and findings from both the 
worldwide and US benchmark, though this coefficient is larger than the worldwide estimates 
and lower than for the US market.  
Annual growth rate of total assets  
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The results show that the domestic market has an annual growth rate of 9.92%. This is 
approximately 2.2% higher than the worldwide market. For the international dataset the rate is 
5.52%, which is 1.5% lower compared to the worldwide estimates.   
The coefficient of difference is -4.5245%, but only significant at 10%. This means that the 
standard error is fairly high which indicates a fair deal of variance in the annual growth rates. 
The results are not surprising, however, for two reasons. Firstly, the worldwide benchmark 
also shows that internationally issuing firms tend to have a lower growth rate than those 
issuing domestic. Secondly, a high annual growth rate is a characteristic often related to small 
firms experiencing success, whilst the growth rate of more mature firms are lower. Relating to 
the results found on the difference in size, it seems intuitive that the domestic firms are 
smaller and therefore likely to achieve higher growth rates that the more mature or large firms 
issuing abroad. This is, however, more of a stylized fact, and does not dictate the reality. As 
the coefficient does not have a stronger level of significance, it indicates that the firms issuing 
abroad are not only mature firms. 
Summing up, the results suggest that firms issuing bonds in the domestic market seems to 
have a higher annual growth rates than firms issuing internationally. Though the results show 
signs of weakness related to its significance 
Investment 
Investment is represented by the features of Capital expenditure, Capex, and Capex pr unit of 
revenue. Starting with the first feature, the Capex for domestic firms is at 48 838. This is close 
to twice the size of the worldwide level. As for the international set, the result is at 547 140, 
which is also higher than the worldwide level by approximately 200 000.  The coefficient of 
difference is 497 206, and is significant at 1%. This means that the firms issuing bonds abroad 
tend to have a much higher level of capital expenditure. This is also in line with the 
benchmarks for the worldwide estimates. 
As for Capex pr unit sales, the median for domestic issuing firms is at 3.8%. This is exactly 
the same as the estimate for the worldwide ratio. For the international issuing firms, the ratio 
is at 6.52%, which is 1.5% higher than the world wide estimate. Whilst the difference 
coefficient for the worldwide benchmark was 1.3% at 1% significance, the Norwegian 
coefficient has a coefficient of 2.72%, but only significant at a 10% level. Since the Capex 
coefficient was high at a 1% significance level, this may indicate instability or high variance 
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in sales. As described in section 4.6, a large part of the firms operate in industries where the 
cash flows may come in large batches and at sporadic times. These sudden large revenues 
therefore become scattered and affect the ratio creating a high variance. This may be a 
plausible reason for why this ratio is only significant at 10%.  
The results show that internationally issuing firms tend to invest more than firms issuing 
domestically. This is apparent both for levels and in relation to sales, though the latter shows 
signs of low significance. The results are also coherent with worldwide estimates. 
Profitability  
In order to look at the firms’ profitability, the focus is turned towards the owners’ profitability 
and thus the return on equity. The domestic set of firms has a median of 7.25% return on 
equity and the international set of firms 12.43%. Looking at the worldwide estimates, the 
domestic issuing firms have a ratio of 7.8%, whilst the international issuing firms has a ratio 
of 7.6%. Defining what a good return on equity is depends on the cost of capital for the given 
period and the industry to which it is related.  Whether or not these Returns of equity are good 
or not will not be pursue further in this analysis. 
Using the worldwide estimates as the benchmark does not give a solid answer either, since 
this key figure may vary a lot with time. However, since there is only a three year difference, 
the coefficients may function as approximations. With these assumptions, the domestic set of 
firms is close to the worldwide approximation, while the international set of firms is quite 
different. The Norwegian firms issuing internationally are 3.6% higher than the worldwide 
estimate. This also affects the coefficient of difference, which is 4.094%. In other words, the 
firms issuing internationally seem to have a median return on equity of 4.094% higher than 
the domestic issuing firms. 
The main conclusion is that the results suggest that firms issuing internationally are more 
profitable than the domestic issuing firms. 
Capital structure  
Capital structure is based on total debt and short-term debt. The total debt is analyzed in 
relation to total assets, and short-term debt in relation to total debt. The total debt to total 
assets ratio illustrates what leverage the firms have, and also provides an indication of the 
long-term risk.  The short-term debt to total debt ratio projects how much of the debt is 
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current. It gives an indication of firms’ reliance on short-term financing. Though bonds are 
not the only solution to long-term financing, this ration shows which type of financing it 
prefers, and by that which risk profile they are exposed to.  
The results for total debt to total assets show that the median leveraging of firms for both sets 
of firms is reasonably high. The domestic set of firms shows 64.16% and the international set 
shows 61.21%. This indicates a high leverage and following high exposure to risk. Comparing 
the results with the worldwide estimates, the domestic set of firms is 44 percentage points 
higher than the benchmark, and the international set of firms is 31 percentage points higher. 
While this may be interesting for a shareholder or equity investor whose stakes may get 
increased return from the return on debt, a potential bondholder whose large concern is the 
probability of default, may see this as a larger risk or threat.  
Comparing the two medians, the international set of firms has a difference coefficient of – 
2.958% which is significant at 1%. The difference is not, however, of a size that drastically 
improves the overall image or level of risk projected to the investor.   
With such a high level of leverage, an important feature for bond investors is whether the debt 
is due at short- or long-term. With long-term debt, the potential for accruing earnings from 
long-term projects lessens the possibility and fear of defaulting. Short-term debt has a shorter 
maturity than the bonds and may strain the liquidity of a firm. As short-term debt is a post in 
the Financial Income statement, the analysis considers the long-term debt is what is left when 
the short-term debt is subtracted from the total debt.   
The results from the short-term debt ratio show that the domestic set has a median of 30.19% 
and the international set has 32.89%. Comparing them to the worldwide estimates they lie at 
10% and 6% below, respectively. This means that Norwegian firms, issuing both domestically 
and internationally, have higher levels of long-term debt. This may be a result of the type of 
projects being financed and the prospects of unstable cash flows that describe a large part of 
the Norwegian industries’ characteristics.  
An interesting feature of the short-term debt ratio is that the coefficient of 3.056% is not 
significant at an acceptable level. In other words, there is no statistical evidence to claim that 
there is any difference in short-term debt ratio between the two sets of firms  
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Summing up, the results suggest that the debt ratio is high for both sets of firms. However, the 
internationally issuing firms appear to have a slightly lower ratio. For the short-term debt the 
results suggest no significant difference in the two sets of firms.  
Servicing Debt 
The two characteristics of Net income to total debt and Net income to short-term debt are both 
commonly used in calculating credit ratings of corporations
26
 and that project the firm’s 
ability to service its debt. The results show that domestic issuing firms have a median net 
income to total debt ratio of 3.61% and a net income to short-term debt ratio of 10.71%, 
whilst the internationally issuing firms have 5.76% and 20.16% respectively. The difference is 
significant for both ratios and indicates that the firms issuing internationally have better 
prospects of paying their debt. Though the benchmarks do not have comparable ratios, the 
methods used by Standard and Poor characterize an income to total debt ratio of 20% to be in 
line with a BB rating, or Non-investment grade, for industrial firms
27
.  By this view, the firms 
issuing bonds abroad have their median at this level, while the domestically issuing firms are 
9.1 percentage points lower. This suggests that international firms are in a better position to 
service their debt than the domestically issuing firms. The results of these characteristics may 
affect both ratings and the issuing cost of debt. 
Valuation 
The last ratio is the valuation of the firms. Tobin’s q is an easy, but fair ratio for expressing 
how the market values the firm. The ratio tests the market value, or repurchasing value, 
relative to book value. Using the book value as the “fair” value, a ratio above 1 indicates a 
market overvaluation of the firm and if the ratio is beneath 1 it indicates a market 
undervaluation.  Some of the firms did not have available data on share price for the period 
and have therefore been excluded from the test.  However, the results reveal the domestic set 
of firms with a q value of 1.39 whilst the international set of firms scores 1.56. In both sets the 
market tends to over value the firms according to the book value. Looking at the worldwide 
estimates, both sets are over valued at 1.208 and 1.154, respectively. This means that both the 
Norwegian set of firms have a higher “q” and are more overvalued than the worldwide 
estimates. However, spread is bigger for the international issuing firms than for the domestic.   
                                                          
26
 Standardandpoor.com, 2010 
27
 Standardandpoor.com, Criteria for corporate ratings 
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Looking again at the results in table 3, the difference coefficient for the international set is 
0.17, and is significant at 1%. Being significant at such a low coefficient, shows that there is 
less variance in the results of the Tobin’s q, i.e. a lower standard error. In other words, it is a 
well represented characteristic that approximates the actual median quite well.  
Summing up, the results suggest that both the international and the domestic set of firms are 
overvalued. However the internationally issuing firms are slightly more overvalued than 
domestic.  
5.4.3 Summing up the most central characteristics 
Many of the results are close to or share the pattern of the projected worldwide and US 
estimates. Though the Norwegian financial market for bonds may not be as developed and 
large as the US, UK or Germany, they do have diverse and developed industries. The 
characteristics of the Norwegian firms show similar patterns, but with some distinctive 
features both in the firms issuing internationally and for the firms issuing only in the domestic 
market.  
Summing up the results, firstly, the firms issuing internationally are much larger than the 
firms only issuing domestically. Though the difference is a common factor worldwide, the 
spread appears to be much higher for Norwegian firms. Due to the small corporate market, 
this might be a potential reason for the large difference in the number of firms issuing abroad.  
Secondly, the profitability for investors is remarkably higher for the firms issuing 
internationally. There may be many reasons for this, e.g. the firms issuing internationally are 
more successful. Since they appear to hold more equity than the firms issuing domestically, 
they must have a larger net income, indicating a higher level of business and thus success. 
Another reason may be that larger size is an indication of maturity which, in turn, leads to a 
more stable income or cash flow and a higher average net income.  
Finally, a large part of the risk valuation of a firm is its capital structure.  Both the 
international and the domestic issuing firms have fairly high leverages, both from an intuitive 
viewpoint and related to the worldwide estimate. Though the international issuing firms have 
only slightly lower leverage coefficient, these factors may play a larger role in the 
attractiveness of their bonds. Whilst well-known firms may survive the scepticism of high 
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leverage, smaller, lesser-known firms will be met with high scepticism and a complementary 
higher issuance cost to compensate for the added risk of default.  
5.5 CURRENCY EXCHANGE RISK    
A large proportion of the Norwegian goods and services are exported. This means that many 
of the firms producing these goods and services are exposed to cash flows and income in 
other currencies than NOK. Because the NOK is a small currency with a floating exchange 
rate, it is always at risk of having a fluctuating value against other currencies. Figure 10 
shows that the Norwegian Kroner has a relatively stable exchange rate against world leading 
currencies in the time period of 1998 – 2008. However, in having a floating rate there is 
always a certain degree of volatility the exchange rates. Though the majority of the NOK’s 
volatility is relatively small, there are some exceptions. The largest fluctuation was caused by 
the financial crisis of 2008, where the NOK was at its strongest in the start of the year, 
suffering a large depreciation in July and August. The combination of expected cash flows 
and fluctuating exchange rate, gives room to believe that potential strategies to hedge the cash 
flows exist among firms.  
Bond issues in the domestic market are mainly issued in NOK. There are also a smaller 
amount of issues denominated in USD and Euro. As figure 11 illustrates, the bonds in USD 
are mainly in Oil and Gas, Shipping, Service and Telecom/IT. The small number of Euro 
denominated issues is restricted to Energy and Utility and Industry. Table 4 shows the exact 
numbers. These results show the same pattern as for the industries issuing abroad in section 
5.3. The industries issuing bonds in foreign currencies appear to be those with high 
international demand and thus do international operations. 
The domestic market is in general divided into NOK and USD. The European market is the 
closest and for many firms the most common foreign market. The Euro should therefore stand 
as the most common currency in foreign cash flows. However, during this time period it was 
still a young currency that had not settled as a stable and trustworthy currency. The USD, on 
the other hand bore the position as the world leading and stabile currency. This may provide 
an explanation to why there are so few observations of euro denominated bonds, while the 
USD is preferred among the foreign currency. Table 4 shows that the foreign denominated 
issues are only represented by 9% of the total number of bonds issued in domestic market. 














































































































































































Fig. 10 The development of currency exchange rates against the NOK. The development shows that the 
exchanges have a relatively small level of volatility. 2008 is however a year of large volatility in the 
markets and therefore also in the exchange rate. Source: Norges Bank 
The Oil and Gas sector represents the largest proportion of bonds in USD, covering 38%. 
Most of the Oil and Gas exported from Norway is denominated in USD, not only when aimed 
at the US market but also as a common currency for the product. It is therefore a natural 
choice as alternative currency for this sector. Also the Service and Telecom/IT industries are 
relatively well represented with USD denominated bonds, counting 21% and 10% 
respectively.  
The Energy and Utility industry has, despite being the largest represented industry in the 
domestic market, only one issue in Euro and none in USD. Due to problems with 
transportation and storage of their products, the industry is limited to exporting their goods to 
the domestic and European market. It is therefore not naturally exposed to any USD cash 
flows. Adding the fact that the Euro was still considered too risky, there is no great surprise 
that the issues primarily were issued in NOK. 
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Fig. 11. The number of denominated issues in the domestic market sorted by industry and currency. 
Source: Norges Bank 
Industry NOK EUR USD
Proportion 
USD
Oil and Gas 44 0 27 38%
Shipping 64 0 4 6%
Energy and Utility 99 1 0 1% (EUR)
Service 15 0 4 21%
Fishery 4 0 0 0%
Property 38 0 0 0%
Telecom/IT 18 0 2 10%
Wholesale and Retail 13 0 0 0%
Transportation 5 0 0 0%
Pulp and Paper 8 0 0 0%
Food and Beverages 27 0 0 0%
Industry 41 1 1 2%
Total 376 2 38 9%
Number of Denomintated Bonds in Domestic Market
 
Table 4. The number of denominated bonds issued by Norwegian firms in the domestic market sorted 
by industries and currencies.  The proportion sizes are USD in relation to all issues in the industry. 
Exception is Energy and Utilty which is only in Euro. NOK is Norwegian Kroner, EUR is Euros and 
USD is United States Dollars.  Source: Norges Bank 
The international issues are mainly aimed at the European and US investor market. However, 
the range of currencies in which the bonds are denominated is slightly wider. US Dollars, 
Yen, Pound Sterling, Swiss Francs, Deutche Mark most likely converted to Euros, Euros and 
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NOK are used. Figure XX shows how the currencies are spread over the industries. Again 
here the USD is the most represented currency, followed by the Euro. The Oil and gas 
industry is most represented here as well, issued in all currencies except NOK. Telecom/IT 
has a larger number of bonds in Euros and Yen, Energy and Utility in USD, NOK and EUR, 
while the other industries are scarcely spread among the currencies. 
 
 
Fig. 12. The number of denominated issues in the domestic market sorted by industry and currency. USD is 
United State Dollars, JPY is Japanese Yen, GBP is Pound Sterling, SFR is Swiss Franc, DM is Deutche Mark, 
EUR is Euro, and NOK is Norwegian Kroner. Source: Norges Bank 
There are a few difference and some similarities among the results from the two issuing 
markets. Firstly, despite the international and the domestic issues having bonds in foreign 
currencies, there is a larger variance of preferred currencies in the international market. Over 
the time period, the domestic market appears to be limited mostly to NOK and USD. The 
international issues use more of the central and popular currencies. Secondly, the Euro was a 
young currency in the time period, and may therefore suffer from a lack of trust in the 
currency’s stability. It is, though, slightly surprising that only 2 domestic bonds are issued in 
Euros, considering the strong position it has taken as a world currency, the close geographical 
proximity and the number of countries that use it. In comparison, it is the second most 
denominated currency in the abroad issues. This suggests that the domestic market is rather 
limited to the USD, or its local currency, NOK. 
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Industry USD JPY GBP SFR DM EUR NOK
Oil and Gas 14 10 3 5 1 7 0
Energy and Utility 4 0 0 0 0 2 3
Telecom/IT 0 1 0 0 0 8 0
Pulp and Paper 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Shipping 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Food and Beverages 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
Total 22 11 4 5 1 18 3
Number of Denomintated Bonds in International Market
 
Table 5. Number of denominated bonds issued by Norwegian firms in the International Market, sorted by 
industries and currencies. USD is United State Dollars, JPY is Japanese Yen, GBP is Pound Sterling, SFR is 
Swiss Franc, DM is Deutche Mark, EUR is Euro, and NOK is Norwegian Kroner. Source: Norges Bank 
Finally, there is a similarity between the patterns concerning which industries issue foreign 
denominated bonds in the domestic market, and industries issuing bonds in the international 
market, found in section 5.3. As mentioned earlier, these industries are also known to do 
business abroad, which suggest they are also more prone to use foreign currency, both 
domestically and abroad. 
5.6 CREDIT RATINGS 
A credit rating is an assessment of the firm’s or bond’s creditworthiness. In the hectic 
environment of trading, both for bonds and stocks, investors may not have the time to do 
fundamental analyses of their targets. Instead, they put a lot of their trust into the ratings done 
by firms such as Standard and Poor, Moody’s and Fitch. Their ratings cover many aspects of 
the business market, assessing nations, industries, firms or singular securities. The credit 
ratings of international bonds are usually related directly to the bonds themselves. This 
applies also to the bonds issued abroad for the Norwegian firms. Despite the bondholders’ 
main concern of the firm’s capability to pay, some bonds have special properties that enhance 
or reduce the threat of default, and which are not reflected in the firm’s rating. When rating a 
firm or a firm’s bonds, the fundamental analysis made is based on several aspects, e.g. 
national risk, industry risk, and the firm-level characteristics. 
As already mentioned, there are very few Norwegian firms that are rated by the most common 
agencies. A general consent among european banks is that if the firm or bond is not rated by 
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the Standard and Poor, Moody’s or Fitch, it is considered non-rated
28
.  The historical records 
of Bloomberg suggest that only 10 firms have been rated between 1998 and 2008. Table 5 
shows that 8 of the firms rated belong to the internationally issuing dataset. The two 
remaining firms, SAS and DNO International, are also known for doing business abroad and 
are therefore on the radars of foreign investors. Despite the relatively small number of firms 
issuing bonds, this still does not count for more than 8% of all them. The list of all historical 
ratings and changes in the credit rating of Norwegian firm is found in appendix 8.4.  
The results show that while 54% of the firms issuing internationally are rated, only 1.5% of 
the firms issuing domestically are rated. There are two plausible explanations for this 
outcome. The first is the fact that the three most recognized rating agencies do not rate firms 
and issues that are under a certain size, market importance or provide sufficient available 
information. In many cases this is the actual reason. The second reason is that there is not 
enough requests from investors. 
Company Name Best rating Worst rating
Norsk Hydro A BBB
Norske Skogsindustrier BBB BB+
Statoil AA+ A-
Telenor AA+ BBB+
Yara International BBB+ BBB-
PGS BB NR
Ocean Rig B+ NR
Statkraft AS BBB+ BBB+
SAS BB B
DNO International B NR
International 
Domestic
Firm credit ratings - S&P
  
Table 6. List of the Norwegian firms rated by Standard and Poor. Note, that this is the list over industries of 
interest to this thesis and its time frame Source: Bloomberg 
The first concern is highly plausible. The results from section 5.4 show that the size of firms 
issuing domestically are generally low and very much lower than the firms issuing 
internationally. This means that the firms have a fairly small effect and influence on the 
market which again does not intrigue interest among investors. Section 5.1 shows that the 
issue size of the domestically issuing firms are low. A benchmark size for what is considered 
low in international markets lies around 500 million Euros, and issues below 100 million 
                                                          
28
 Source; DCM contact at Credit Agricole, Paris 
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Euros are not even considered.
29
 Looking at the issue sizes, the results indicate that the 
average size of domestic firms do not come close to the 100 million Euros, whilst the 
international issues vary between 500 million and 100 million Euros. These features may 
prove to be a significant reason for the low level of credit ratings among Norwegian firms.  
The differences in firm characteristics also project an interesting feature to the credit ratings. 
The results from section 5.4 suggest that the firms issuing abroad are larger in size, they have 
higher return on equity, and have a less leveraged capital structure. Despite this, a majority of 
the firms are rated investment grade BBB or lower. The exceptions are Norsk Hydro, Statoil 
and Telenor, which are considered Norway’s largest and, historically, the most successful 
firms. This feature says that the set of firms with superior firm-level characteristics are rated 
Investment grades i.e. BBB or lower. This may indicate that the majority of the firms issuing 
in the domestic market would be subject to fairly low ratings if they were rated by the 
recognized rating agencies. Another indication of this is the characteristics on Servicing debt 
in 5.4, where the coefficients for the international set of firms are at the level considered BB 
with S&P, while the domestic issuing firms have much lower coefficients. 
It is important to note that there are other agencies which also rate the creditworthiness of 
Norwegian firms more extensively than the three large agencies.  DnB NOR for instance has 
its own ratings that follow the scale of Standard and Poor. The number of firms rated by DnB 
NOR is substantially larger, but still does not cover more than close to 30% of the number of 
firms in thesis’ dataset
30
.  As a response to the argument of investors being ignorant or 
reluctant towards non-rated firms, the proportion of foreign investors active in the Norwegian 
bond market is considerably high, suggesting that the absence of large agency rating does not 
seem to prevent investors from entering the market. 
To sum up, it is notable that international issuing firms are rated by the large rating agencies 
and the domestic issuing firms are not. The reason for this appears is mainly due to the actual 
size of both issue and firm. The differences in firm characteristics may also play a part in 
complicating the rating, since the domestic issuing firms show worse key ratios than the 
internationally issuing firms. Foreign investors seem, nevertheless, to be attracted to the 
Norwegian domestic bond market.  
                                                          
29
 Source; DCM contact at Credit Agricole, Paris. 
30
 Weekly ratings report from DnB NOR, May 2010. 
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5.7 UNDERWRITERS  
The function of underwriters came from the time when bonds had to be signed or 
underwritten by Lloyds of London, stating that the insurer undertook some of the risk. Today 
the name and role has been split into various subcategories and the job is often divided 
amongst more than one single underwriter. The process of issuing bonds starts with an 
Investment bank which has primarily responsibility for the bond, is commonly known as a 
“book runner” or “lead manager”. Other investment banks may be announced as co lead 
managers, but these do not participate in the issuance of the bond. This is more of a gesture, 
giving the co lead managers a right to a miniscule cut of the fee. It is therefore the book 
runner that aims to sell the bond through its connections and network of asset managers. This 
section of the thesis aims to investigate whether there is any difference between the 
underwriters used by the domestic and international issuing firms. 
Fig. 13. The underwriters managing domestic issued bonds sorted by industry. Source: Stamdata.no 
Figure 12 shows the underwriters of domestic bonds. The most popular are Pareto, DnB NOR 
and Nordea. Unfortunately, over 100 of the issues have no registered underwriter or NA. This 
may be related to a variety of things, for instance that the firm has issued the bonds without an 
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underwriter, the underwriter does not wish to be known, or simply that the available data does 
not state the underwriter. The original source of this data is from the VPS which means there 
is room for error. Excluding the NA underwriters, figure 12 shows that almost all of the firms 
underwriting the domestic issues are from Scandinavia. Looking at the international issues in 
figure 13, on the other hand, only DnB Markets and Nordea Bank Sverige is represented. The 
investment banks used to issue the bonds abroad are large international banks. This indicates 
that although the Scandinavian banks are represented in various global areas and markets, the 
firms still prefer the larger investment banks when issuing outside the domestic market. This 
is clear since there are several firms that issue both abroad and domestically. 
Fig. 14 Underwriters of International bonds sorted by industry. Data Source: Thompson Reuters’ SDC 
database for new issues 
The results provide clear evidence that firms change underwriters when issuing abroad. 
According to Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001), there is evidence of firms changing 
underwriters based on the underwriter’s reputation as well as additional and influential analyst 
coverage that would enhance their firm and bond’s reputation in the market. 
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Looking at the results from the domestic bonds, both the Nordea and DnB Markets, 
underwriting the second and third largest number of firms, are represented abroad. The largest 
underwriter, Pareto Securities however, is not represented as underwriters among 
international bonds. This is, despite having offices in both New York and Singapore. This 
gives reason to believe that there may be certain individual reasons affecting their reputation. 
One of these plausible reasons is that investment banks, or underwriters, are either too small 
or specialized to cover the targeted market in which the bonds are to be issued
31
. Other 
reasons may be related to the management fees, or dissatisfaction with the issuing price that 
underwriters may achieve. These features usually decide the underwriter’s skill and ability to 
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 Source; DCM contact at Credit Agricole, Paris. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
This section aims to discuss the results found above and to relate them to the existing theories 
described in part 2. Most of the results are not conclusive enough to exclaim the theories as 
true or false for this market. They allow, however, suggestions to be made as to which 
theories seem more appropriate in explaining traits and patterns in the Norwegian bond 
issuing market. This section will therefore discuss potential links between the results from 
part 5 and the theories described part 2. Each theory is discussed in turn, and summarized at 
the end. 
6.1 SEGMENTATION VIEW 
The segmentation view is a theory that can be applied to many levels and structures. It is 
therefore very applicable to the results in this thesis, since there are aspects on both industrial 
and firm characteristics that differentiate between those which issue abroad and which that do 
not. An important factor in considering the existence of segmentation is not whether there is a 
difference between the two sets of firms, but that the differences acts as a barrier or direct bias 
when firms choose to issue bonds. 
6.1.1 National level 
Starting off with the national bond market, Norway does suffer from being a small country 
with a low level of liquidity. Though the Norwegian government bonds are top notch and 
considered some of the safest bonds in the world, they do not reflect the perceived view of the 
corporate bond market. In the international environment for bond issuing it is normal for each 
bond to be rated. In the Norwegian domestic market the number of ratings from international 
rating agencies is so low, barely covering 10 – 15 firms in total.  
Oslo ABM has been a large enhancement to the activity of the domestic bond market. Many 
of the small firms that would not otherwise meet the criteria of the Oslo Børs, now have a 
place to issue. However, not following the international regulations of the EU may cause 
problems related to expectations and access to information which investors need in order to 
correctly analyze and calculate risk. The basis of this argument builds on the results of 
differences in firm characteristics and the purpose of the ABM. This is, however, not proven 
rhetoric. 
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Oslo Børs, on the other hand, is directed to follow the regulations and directives of the EU. 
This means that it incorporates the same regulations and rules that apply to other stock 
exchanges. Oslo Børs also cooperates with major stock exchanges by using similar trading 
systems. This should lessen any barriers related to method or access for trading.  
All in all, there are both pros and cons for the Norwegian bond market being segmented from 
the larger and more developed markets in the world. An important indication of how 
segmented the market is lies with the number of foreign participants and amount of foreign 
trade there is. As a majority of the largest banks represent the members at Oslo Børs, and 
counts as the second largest investor group in the corporate bond market, it seems fair to say 
that the level of segmentation at a national level is very low. This argument should, however, 
be tested more with regards to macroeconomic factors, at a more extensive aggregate level, 
and especially in relation to the ABM’s activity. 
The Norwegian bond market, as a whole, seems not to be segmented in relation to other 
international markets. Its relatively small size and activity seems simply to be a problem that 
relates to the actual size of its surrounding corporate market, domestic investors and array of 
industries. 
6.1.2 Industrial level 
The first results that are of interest are the industrial patterns for issuing abroad. The 
industries issuing internationally are dominated by firms that, owing to origin of market 
demand, seem to do more business abroad. This pattern is fairly strong, suggesting a possible 
segmentation based on industries affiliation. In general, this alone does not give enough 
evidence to prove the existence of segmentation in industries, also owing to the fact that the 
barriers may be of natural choice. Among the industries, only the results for the shipping and 
fishery industries provide a strong enough indication that specialized markets exist. Shipping 
is a worldwide business, yet all the Norwegian shipping firms choose to issue their bonds in 
the Norwegian domestic market. The same goes for the fish-farming industry, which despite 
having most, or all, of its production based in Norway, is still the country’s second largest 
export product. The interesting fact is that Norway and Oslo Børs is renowned as a world-
leading market for both Fish farming and Shipping. It therefore would appear that these two 
markets are more specialized on the Oslo Børs, which create the bias that cause the Shipping 
and Fish-farming firms to prefer the domestic market 
Page | 62  
 
As for the industries issuing abroad, the few observations make it hard to find any clear 
patterns of preferred markets. However, a majority of the firms issuing internationally also 
issue bonds in the domestic market. This suggests that the international markets do not seem 
to impose any preferred market for the firms. The original bond data only specifies the issuing 
marketplace as a general, stating that the issues are mainly related to the European, US or 
foreign market. The results are therefore not conclusive and should be researched further. 
There is a clear difference in the choice of undertaker when issuing abroad and in the 
domestic market. As mentioned in section 5.6, most of the large foreign investment banks 
undertake only a certain issue size. Section 5.2 reveal that the sizes issued in the domestic 
market are far from the criteria. The criterion of a certain issue size appears to stand as a 
structural barrier and may be a reason for why many small firms do not issue abroad. Though 
there are Scandinavian banks that operate with international issues, they are relatively small in 
coverage and reputation. This barrier may also appear to be an extension of the barrier that 
follows the lack of rating and investor recognition. This will however be discussed more in 
section 6.2.  
6.1.3 Firm level 
The results of the characteristics in 5.4 show a lot of differences between the two sets of 
firms. It is therefore intuitive to suggest that many of these characteristics dictate the markets 
in which the firms choose to issue their bonds. The results show that there are clear 
differences in most of the characteristics, e.g. size, annual growth and profitability. The 
question is however whether these differences act as barriers, and thus creating segmented 
markets.  
There are legal barriers, regulations or structural barriers preventing firms from issuing abroad 
based on their size, profitability or other characteristic that has been tested in this thesis. Since 
Norway has been a part of the Schengen agreement, most of the regulations found in Europe 
also apply to the Norwegian system. This is an attempt to integrate markets, removing barriers 
and complication affairs related to cross country dealings. There are even governmental 
institutions, like Innovasjon Norge, that encourage and support smaller firms in expanding 
their business abroad and dealings abroad.  
The first idea wants to suggest that the difference in firm characteristics must be some sort of 
segmentation. Some of them are large and significant, and have a determining affect on the 
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firms and where they issue. However, since there are no structural barriers, these affects seem 
to be of different reasons than alone being the reason to segmentation. One of the clearest 
examples is the differences in the size of the firms. A resulting feature of this characteristic is 
that it is only the largest firms that get rated. Having a rating may act as a barrier to issuing 
internationally. Without a rating the firm stands a lower chance of achieving high demand, 
with a subsequent increased in the cost of debt. Then again, there are observations that prove 
this wrong, e.g Orkla ASA that issued 3 bonds in the international market with were non-
rated.  
One could, of course, define the domestic market as a biased or more specialized market for 
smaller firms. This would weigh in favour of the idea of the domestic market being biased. 
However, this applies to most countries and its reasons lie elsewhere than structural barriers 
or biased markets.  
6.1.4 Summing up 
Neither the national market nor the firm characteristics show any clear patterns suggesting the 
existence of segmentation. Firstly, Oslo Børs’ position in the European market seems to be 
small, but it is a respected market with many foreign members. Further research should 
investigate whether the ABM has the same status, or whether it is a more uninteresting market 
because of its structure and rules. Secondly, it seems natural to believe that the differences in 
characteristics provide evidence of segmentation alone. But though these differences are 
significant and divide the firms, they do not in themselves create barriers or biases preventing 
the firms from issuing abroad. Finally, sorting by industries there are patterns that indicate 
segmented markets which affect the firms’ issuance choice. This is clearer for the industries 
of Shipping and Fish-farming. It shows that such markets do exist and that many firms may 
decide to issue in markets where the market is specialized towards the industry.  This also 
seems natural, as the investors in this market know the industry better and thus have better 
knowledge and information.  
6.2 INVESTOR RECOGNITION 
Norway plays a strong role in many of the international industries in the world and has 
marked its place on the map of business. It is also known for its large wealth and oil supplies. 
Page | 64  
 
In comparison the Norwegian corporations are not as well known. This topic will be discussed 
in three parts: firm and industry specifics, credit ratings and the use of underwriters. 
6.2.1 Firm and industry specifics 
To be seen in the world of business there are some features that attract attention more than 
others. Firstly, the larger the firm, the more noticeable it is in market representation, in its 
resource or facility access, in its level of success or in its status among other firms and 
investors. Looking at the list of firms issuing internationally, they are all firms that are well-
known in the domestic environment and are often related to as firms that are market leaders in 
the domestic market. It is therefore highly plausible that these large firms also are well-known 
and recognized outside the domestic market. They therefore stand a better chance of 
achieving a higher demand by issuing abroad with a larger pool of investors which would 
lower the cost of debt more than would be possible in the domestic market.  
Another feature that is important in order to increase recognition abroad is the markets in 
which the firms do business. The results do not show individually which firms trade abroad 
but, based on the industries, there is a pattern indicating that the firms issuing abroad also tend 
to do larger parts of their business abroad. By doing business in foreign markets the firms 
operate as a competitor to local and other international firms. Thus, the firms appear on the 
radar of investors who only do business in the respective markets. Being a participant in these 
markets increases the awareness of the firm’s existence and operations. There are, however, 
examples that raise doubt to this theory. For example, the shipping and fishery industries both 
operate internationally and attract attention and recognition, but still choose not to issue 
abroad. On the other hand, as discussed under section 6.1, this is most likely caused by the 
existence of specialized markets which create the centre of attraction rather than firms 
themselves. The argument that international business and trade increases awareness and 
recognition appears both as strongly intuitive and backed by the indications from the patterns 
in section 5.3. 
The firm characteristics also provide another feature that may prove interesting among 
investors. According to basic portfolio theory, the investor is concerned with two elements – 
risk and return. Looking at section 5.4, the firms issuing internationally prove less risky and 
yield a higher return. The risk is shown in terms of credit ratings, asset size, capital structure 
and debt servicing ability, whilst the return is shown in terms of profitability. This, in itself, 
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does not increase the general awareness of the firm, but it increases the attractiveness of the 
firm which in turn is more likely to be recognized as a good investment.  
From these patterns it may be argued that the firms issuing abroad experience a larger 
awareness and recognition among international investors and may, therefore, issue bonds in 
the international environment with the benefits described in section 2.2. The main features 
that indicate this are: firm size, industry affiliation and, potentially, the beneficial risk return 
characteristics. Though there is little doubt that investor recognition is a vital feature, there is 
not a theoretical acceptance to whether there actually is a lowering cost effect of issuing 
abroad which would confirm the theory. The effects on investor recognition needs therefore 
more research. 
6.2.2 Credit Ratings 
The majority of Norwegian firms are not rated by the large international rating agencies. Most 
investors and asset managers use the large rating agencies in their analysis of 
creditworthiness. According to Standard and Poor the status as non-rated is mostly due to the 
lack of available data or because there are no requests to rate the firm. It is therefore hard to 
point out any conclusions as to why there are so few ratings of Norwegian firms.  There are, 
however, some features that may give some indications. One reason is that the ratings are 
done by independent agencies. They therefore rate the firms they feel are ratable or are most 
valuable and requested by asset managers and investors, i.e. the firms which are most 
recognized. The fact that most of the firms issuing internationally are rated suggests that this 
may be owing to a large number of requests which, in turn, may be an indication of 
awareness. However, as the number of requests is unknown it might simply be a result of the 
issue being directed towards an international market. The foreign markets are more developed 
and may have criteria of accounting standards with access to data that are more in line with 
the rating agencies’ criteria than those provided in the Norwegian market. The results of the 
credit ratings are therefore considered too vague to give any indication of whether investor 
recognition plays a significant role in issuing internationally or not. 
6.2.3 The use of underwriters 
The results of underwriters show that the firms use different underwriters, or book runners, 
when issuing abroad. While the domestic issues are handled by Scandinavian banks, the 
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foreign issues are made by prominent, local or international banks. While the theories of 
Merton (1987) and Tawatnunchai and Yaman (2008) gain support from the firm and industry 
specifics in section 6.2.1, the results of the choice of underwriters suggests that the firm’s 
reputation and recognition is also dependent on the reputation and recognition of the 
underwriter. As mentioned in section 5.6, this is in line with Krigman, Shaw and Womack 
(2001), who found evidence that firms change underwriters owing to their reputation and 
strategic analysis coverage. In other words, the recognition and reputation of the firm itself 
might get the investors interested, but in terms of issue price and selling the bond, the cost of 
debt is based on the ability of the underwriter. The way bonds are sold through asset managers 
in other banks and syndicates, it seems intuitive that the reputation and network of the book 
runner plays an important role in issuing the bond. This does not, however, contradict the 
arguments of Merton (1987) nor of Tawatnunchai and Yaman (2008), but suggests that the 
firm’s recognition is not the only reputation needed when issuing the bonds. 
6.2.4 Summing up 
To sum up the three sub-sections, the results seem to indicate that investor recognition of the 
firms is an important feature. Firstly, size, profitability and risk, and type of industry seem to 
be important determinants in creating awareness and recognition among investors. Secondly, 
the results do not provide solid evidence as to whether the firms issuing abroad are more 
recognized that the firms issuing domestically. However, whilst the majority of the firms 
issuing abroad are known as market leaders and large participants, the majority of the firms 
issuing in the domestic market are young, small and are generally less recognized. Finally, the 
last subsection suggests that the reputation of the underwriter issuing the bonds is an 
important feature when issuing the bonds.  From the results it appears that in the larger 
market, the more prominent, recognized and present underwriters are preferred. 
6.3 BONDING VIEW 
The reason why this topic is especially of interest in the Norwegian market is due to the 
ownership structure which exists in a large quantity of the firms. As mentioned, many of the 
firms were founded as government agencies, by families or by entrepreneurs. Though many 
firms have been listed on public exchanges, large stakes of the firms have remained or been 
bought up by single owners. The following sections are divided into two central topics within 
the bonding view; corporate control and private benefits.  
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6.3.1 Corporate control 
From a national point of view, there are very few laws or legal restrictions directly protecting 
firms. However, a few issues do exist. The first relates to the domestic market competition. In 
some industries there are few participants who, therefore, own larger market shares or have a 
monopoly. When a firm is founded, accessing the specific market, it is to some extent 
protected by the law on competition from being swallowed up by the dominant firm. There 
have been several examples of this in the Telecom and Transportation industries. This 
protection follows the regulations given by the EU. In other words, the legislation and 
regulations are much the same as in other European markets, but are more often applied 
because of the market size.  
Secondly, the involvement of and investments by the Norwegian sovereign funds is an 
interesting feature in the corporate bond market. As their purpose is only to invest and not 
control, their ownership may present a complicating obstacle for any firm interested in 
acquiring another firm. By obstacle the argumentation does not mean excluding the 
possibilities for a takeover, but rather an entity that may not sell as easily and thus 
complicating the transaction. In such a setting, having owners with similar purposes and 
guidelines as the sovereign funds, may serve as a sort of protection. 
The results on firm level characteristics show that both international and domestic leverage is 
very high. Following the reasoning from Garvey and Hanka (1999), this may be a response to 
the low level of protectionism. However, there are also other characteristics which divide the 
two sets of firms. It can be thought that a reason for a high leverage is to make the firm less 
interesting as a target for corporate control and takeover. The firms issuing abroad have lower 
leverage than the domestic issuing firms. The results also show that firms issuing 
internationally are larger in size, have higher profitability and appear to operate in industries 
where there is a larger portion of business abroad. Following the reasoning of Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003), the characteristics support the idea that international markets are more 
open to corporate control, through higher level of quality in corporate governance.       
The results also show that the domestic issuing firms and their bonds are seldom rated by 
international firms. Adding the resulting differences in the characteristics on capital structure, 
the reasoning and findings of Qiu and Yu (2009) suggest that bondholders in the domestic 
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issuing firms should be more sensitive to the risk of bad managerial governance rather than 
the added risk of leverage-increasing takeovers.  
Unfortunately, owing to the limitations of the available data and to the extent of the thesis, 
there are no specific patterns in the yield levels or ratings between international and domestic 
bond issues. Based on what results there are, however, there are no apparent links directly 
between the threat of corporate control and which markets the bonds are issued in. There are, 
however, some factors which indicate that corporate control is an issue, and should be further 
researched  
6.3.2 Private benefits  
The discussion now turns towards the other aspect of the bonding view; the issue of private 
benefits, the affecting features on bondholders, and firms’ choice to issue abroad in order to 
control it. 
The Norwegian market has a reasonably sophisticated and large framework effectively 
enforcing debt law and monitoring the market. According to both Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
and Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) the presence of bondholder protection reduces the yields 
and increases the corporate bond ratings. The aim of this thesis is not to prove this, but rather 
to assess whether this is a factor that affects the firms in choosing market place.  
The Norwegian market for corporations and firms is relatively small. The government is also 
involved in many of the firms, both passively and actively. There is a wide specter of media 
dedicated to covering the domestic business market. There are both governmental and 
independent agencies monitoring activity and transactions in the stock and bond market. 
EFTA’s surveillance authority, ESA, also works together with the Ministry of Finance to 
monitor the markets. In addition, there is also a police division, “Økokrim” which specializes 
in economic fraud and criminality and which actively monitors several areas of the market. 
There is therefore little room for extensive benefits. There are, however, occasions when 
people and owners try to get caught, but the extraction or use of private benefits is not done 
openly. With no statistics or research on the matter, there is no way of telling to what extent 
this occurs. 
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When considering the Norwegian market the general opinion is that the practice of extraction 
of private benefits is no more prevalent than in any of the developed markets. Previous 
happenings and actions demonstrate that the government, and even the population of Norway, 
wants to stand as a law-abiding example. For example, when Norwegian firms have been 
involved in international dealings that have included bribes and unethical ways of business 
dealings, it has been publicly criticized and criminally investigated. The last decade has also 





, and, following the recent financial crisis of 2008, all 
monitoring methods are being intensified.  
The extraction, or exploitation, of private benefits is an act most often likely to be carried out 
by the ownership side of the firm. For managers of Norwegian firms the choice may be to list 
stocks or bonds on foreign exchanges. This would be so as to commit to more developed laws 
and monitoring frameworks than domestic ones thus lowering the cost of issuing the bonds. 
For Norwegian firms this seems not to be the case. With such a large national focus on the 
topics and with the surrounding institutions monitoring the market, the benefits of issuing in 
the international markets in order to gain more protection from exploitation of private benefits 
seem miniscule.   
6.3.3 Summing up 
Based on the results showing differences in the traits between the firms issuing internationally 
and domestically, the argumentation and existing theories suggest that the bonding view is 
doubtfully a influencing determinant for firms and managers looking to issue corporate bonds. 
This applies both in terms of avoiding private benefits and governance related to corporate 
control. 
Both the topics discussed under the bonding view do, however, have properties that suggest a 
certain level of presence and perception of this in the domestic market. Most of the properties 
seem to affect the domestic market alone, and do not therefore provide potential patterns 
related to international issuance. It terms of analyzing the domestic market and patterns 
related to general issuance of bonds, these topics should be further researched  
                                                          
32
 Campaign on ”smøring”, 2006 – 2007 
 
33
 Campaign against money laundering, 2004, regjeringen.no  
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6.4 HEDGING CURRENCY RISK 
Among the domestic bond issuances 9% are issued in USD. 6% of these are within the Oil 
and Gas sector. The other industries are Shipping, Telecom/IT and Service. These are all 
industries that have demand and sell their products or service abroad. Expecting cash flows in 
foreign currencies, gives them therefore incentives to issue bonds in order to hedge the 
currency risk.  
For the Oil and Gas industry the dominant currency for trade is USD. Therefore firms in this 
industry are more exposed to cash flows from abroad, and thus currency exchange risk. It is 
therefore not unexpected that both their domestic and international bonds are denominated in 
USD or other currencies. This strongly supports the idea of bonds used for hedging purposes. 
The results show that Shipping and Service are industries that do not issue bonds in the 
international market. It is therefore very interesting to see that they are among the industries 
that issue USD bonds in the domestic market. In section 6.1, the results showed an indication 
of a specialized market for Shipping in the domestic market. When 6% of the bonds are 
denominated in USD, and the 94% left are denominated in NOK, this suggests that the market 
for Shipping Bonds have no problems issuing in NOK as a currency and that the reason for 
denominating in USD appears to be connected to currency risk. Also the Service industry 
issues are primarily issued in NOK, which makes the bonds in USD appear to be issued with 
similar intentions of hedging. 
In the case of hedging strategies, issuing bonds denominated in USD bonds may well serve as 
direct hedges of cash flows in USD. But with the strength and status USD had in the period of 
1998 and 2008, it may well be a cross hedging strategy for cash flows in currencies either 
pegged, strongly correlated with or affected by the USD. From the results there is no evidence 
suggesting whether the domestic USD issues intend for cross or direct hedging. Some of the 
industries such as Oil and Gas seem to have greater incentives for direct hedging of the USD, 
while the other industries are more ambiguous.  
For the international issues, there is a larger range of currencies. The reasons for using foreign 
currencies in foreign markets might well be as much to attract foreign or local investors, adapt 
the market, or other strategic intentions as hedging the currency risk. The results are therefore 
ambiguous and show little evidence of whether firms issue to hedge. However, there are some 
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indications that suggest that hedging is a part of the strategy. Many of the bonds are issued in 
currencies that are different from the local one. For instance, the issues in Japanese Yen are 
all issued in the Euro or US market. There are also bonds in US Dollar issued in the Euro 
market and Vice versa. The intention seems therefore more likely to be related to hedging 
currency risk rather than simply attracting local investors and adapting to local currency. 
6.5 SUMMARY OF THE THEORIES 
Many of these theories are of a character that they overlap and explain each other. It is 
therefore difficult to separate one from the other. Investor recognition may for instance follow 
the patterns of segmented markets. Choice of currency may also be limited due to 
segmentations. However, the discussion on each theory has tried to single them out and relate 
to the results. The results and reasoning has found that there are strong indications that there 
the segmentation theory and investor recognition play parts in the patterns of bond issuing. 
The results also suggest that the hedging theory is a plausible strategy for the firms issuing. 
Unfortunately, the patterns related to hedging are not exclusive enough to rule out other 
strategies or intentions regarding the currency choice on the bonds. The theory therefore only 
remains plausible. The bonding view is the only theory that appears more unlikely to have an 
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7. CONCLUSION 
This thesis aims to research patterns of the international bond issuances among Norwegian 
firms. The main focus was set on the firm level, which was proved to be a challenging task in 
terms of accessible data. From various sources, the database finally consisted of 412 domestic 
bonds, and 73 international bonds, issued by a total of 124 firms over the time period of 1998 
till 2008. 111 of the firms were categorized as only issuing in the domestic market, and the 
last 15 issuing internationally.    
In order to get a better understanding of the firms’ characteristic patterns, the bond issuances 
were first descriptively analyzed at aggregate level both in total and sorted for industries. The 
results showed that the international issues were, on average, much larger than the domestic 
issues. Furthermore, only half of the industries were represented among the issues abroad. 
One of the main features and reasoning for this outcome was the amount of business done 
abroad, and large intensity of exporting goods and services. Another industrial pattern that 
emerged was how the shipping industry consequently issued bonds in the domestic market. 
The reasoning behind this was related to the specialized, or segmented, market that Oslo Børs 
offers and presents within shipping.  
The observations of the characteristics were in some areas very volatile between the 
industries. By using bootstrapping methods, and the non-parametric, quantile regression, the 
volatile data was processed and resulted in statistically accepted coefficients. The emerging 
results proved the characteristics of the two set of firms to be very different. In almost all of 
the characteristics, the international issuing firms had better features. Firms issuing 
internationally proved to be much larger in terms of assets that the domestic issuing firms. 
They had also a higher return of equity, higher capex, and they had better prospects of 
servicing their debt. The characteristics for capital structure showed both the set of firms were 
fairly high leveraged, though the firms issuing internationally showed a slightly lower debt to 
assets ratio. While the annual growth proved to be at a higher among the domestic issuing 
firms, this is believed to be a result of differences in size and development of the firm.  
The analysis also resolved patterns in the credit ratings, denomination of bonds, and choice of 
underwriters in order to get a more surrounding image of the bond issuing patterns. The 
results showed that only a very few of the Norwegian firms were rated by international rating 
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agencies. Those rated, were mainly among the firms issuing abroad, though the majority of 
them were rated as BBB or lower. The reason for this was thought to be access to information 
and lack of requirements from clients this should, however, be more researched more 
qualitatively. As for the use of underwriter, there patterns show that while the domestic bonds 
are underwritten by Scandinavian banks and agencies, the international bonds are 
underwritten by larger international banks and agencies. Only three banks were represented to 
underwrite in both markets. This is backed by theory of investor recognition, but shows that it 
is not only the firm’s recognition and reputation that is of important when issuing bonds 
internationally.   
Among the theories discussed the most plausible and present explanations among the patterns 
are the investor recognition and currency risk hedging. The segmentation view seems also to 
be present, especially in relation to the Shipping and Fish farming industry. Finally, the 
bonding view appears to have little or no relation in the patterns from these results. However, 
there are aspects of the view that seems to be of significance in the Norwegian corporate 
market, and should be further researched. 
This thesis does not aim to prove or rebut the theories discussed in the published literature. 
For that it is not extensive enough. However, this thesis has linked the patterns and results to 
some of these existing theories in order to support or oppose their presence in affecting the 
choices of Norwegian firms issuing bond. In doing so the thesis provides directions, and 
hopefully encouragement, to further research on the patterns and features associated with the 
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8. APPENDIX 
8.1 LIST OF FIRMS 
Figure 12 shows the list of all firms in the dataset used in this thesis. The firms are also 
divided into firms only issuing domestically and firms issuing internationally. 
List of firms comprising the dataset
Domestic International
Ability Drilling ASA Energiselskapet Buskerud AS PETROMENA ASA Aker Solutions ASA
Actinor Shipping ASA Entra Eiendom AS Posten Norge AS E-CO Energi AS
Agder Energi AS Farstad Shipping ASA Prosafe ASA Enitel
Aker ASA Felleskjøpet AGRI BA Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA Norsk Hydro ASA
Aker BioMarine ASA Fred. Olsen Energy ASA Revus Energy ASA Norske Skogindustrier ASA
Akershus Energi Fredrikstad Energi AS Rieber & Søn ASA Northern Offshore Ltd.
Altinex Oil Norway AS Frontier Drilling ASA Rocksource ASA Ocean Rig ASA
American Shipping Company ASA Hafslund ASA Roxar ASA Ocean Rig Norway AS
APL ASA Havila Shipping ASA Seadrill Limited Orkla ASA
Austevoll Seafood ASA Hexagon Composites ASA Selvaag Gruppen AS Petroleum Geo-Services
Avantor ASA I.M. Skaugen SE Sevan Marine ASA Statkraft AS
Ballangen Energi AS Ignis ASA Siem Offshore Inc. StatoilHydro ASA
Belships ASA InterOil Exploration and Production ASA Sinvest AS Telenor ASA
Bergen Group ASA Kenor ASA Skanska Norge Telenor Communication
Bergenshalvøens Komm. Kraftselskap AS Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS Software Innovation ASA Yara International ASA
BIR AS Kongsberg Gruppen ASA Sogn og Fjordane Energi AS
Blom ASA Kværner ASA Solstad Offshore ASA
BW Gas ASA Linstow Songa Offshore SE
Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA Loki ASA Steen & Strøm ASA
Cecon ASA Lyse Energi AS StepStone ASA
Color Group ASA Marine Harvest ASA STX Europe ASA
COSL Drilling NattoPharma ASA Tafjord Kraft
Crystal Production ASA NextGenTel Holding ASA Tandberg Data ASA
Deep Sea Supply ASA NorgesGruppen ASA Telio Holding ASA
DeepOcean ASA Norse Energy Corp. ASA TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA
DNO International ASA Northern Logistic Property ASA Thon Holding AS
DOF ASA Nortura BA Thule Drilling ASA
DOF Subsea ASA Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA Tine BA
Eastern Drilling ASA Norwegian Energy Company ASA Tordenskjold ASA
EDB Business Partner ASA Norwegian Property ASA TTS Marine ASA
Eidsiva Energi AS Ocean HeavyLift ASA Umoe AS
Eidsiva Rederi ASA Oceanteam ASA Visma ASA
Eitzen Chemical ASA Odfjell SE VMetro ASA
Eitzen Maritime Services ASA Olav Thon Eiendomsselskap ASA Wega Mining ASA
Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA Oslo Bolig og Sparelag Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA
Elkem ASA Petrojack ASA
Eltek ASA Petrolia Drilling ASA
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8.2 EXCHANGE RATES 
The exchange rate is USD pr NOK. They are extracted from 
Norges Bank, the central Bank of Norway. They are calculated 
based on the daily average currency exchange rate per year. 
Throughout the thesis these are used in order to exchange USD 
denominated bonds, financial statements and any other statistic in 
order to be correctly compared with similar figures denominated 
in NOK.  
 
 
Table 8. USD/NOK exchange rates. Source: Norges Bank 
 
8.3 ISSUING PATTERNS SORTED BY INDUSTRIES 
Table 9 and 10 show the number of bonds issued by each industry over the whole time period 
1998 – 2008. The numbers reflect the number of issued in total, where the domestic market 
had a lot of issues, especially at the end of the period, while the international issues are low 
and spread. The Oil and Gas industry clearly represent the largest issuing industry. 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Industry 2 2 - 1 2 2 2 3 6 10 1
Service 1 - - 1 - 1 1 3 5 5 1
Energy and Utility 3 1 3 4 2 7 7 5 5 6 5
Property 2 - 1 1 1 2 3 3 6 4 1
Food and Beverages 1 - - 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 2
Transportation 1 - - - - 1 - - - 1 1
Shipping - 1 3 4 - 2 4 5 13 8 1
Insurance - 1 - - - - - - - 0 -
Oil and Gas - - 3 3 1 1 5 10 12 10 3
Fishery - - 1 - - - - - - 1 -
Pulp and Paper - - 1 1 - - 1 - - 1 -
Wholesale and Retail - - - 1 - 1 2 2 1 4 -
Telecom/IT - - - 1 1 - 1 - 7 - 1
Domestic - Number of issues per Year sorted by industry














Page | 76  
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Industry 1 1 1 - - - 2 - - - -
Service - - - - - - - - - - -
Energy and Utility - - - - - - 2 - 1 1 -
Property - - - - - - - - - - -
Food and Beverages - - - - - - - - - 1 -
Transportation - - - - - - - - - - -
Shipping - - - - - - - - - - -
Insurance - - - - - - - - - - -
Oil and Gas 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - -
Fishery - - - - - - - - - - -
Pulp and Paper - - - 1 - - - - - 1 -
Wholesale and Retail - - - - - - - - - - -
Telecom/IT - - 1 - 2 - - 1 1 1 -
International - Number of issues per Year sorted by industry
Table 10. The number of bonds issued in the international market sorted by industry and year 
8.4 HISTORICAL CHANGES IN CREDIT RATINGS OF NORWEGIAN FIRMS  
Table 11 shows the ratings and their changes of all Norwegian firms rated by Standard and 
Poor in the period of 1998 – 2008. The figures show that the only Statoil ASA, Telenor and 
Norsk Hydro had ratings of A or higher. The majority of the firms are rated BBB or lower. 
The signs for *+/- are related to expected positive or negative change. The “NR” and blank 
means Non-rated. 
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Company Name Date Agency New Rating Last Rating Country
Norsk Hydro 3-Aug-07 S&P BBB A-*- NO
Norsk Hydro 18-Dec-06 S&P A-*- A- NO
Norsk Hydro 2-Jun-06 S&P A- A NO
Norske Skogsindustrier 23-Sep-08 S&P BB- BB-*- NO
Norske Skogsindustrier 21-Apr-08 S&P BB-*- BB NO
Norske Skogsindustrier 28-Jan-08 S&P BB BB+ NO
Norske Skogsindustrier 14-Nov-06 S&P BB+ BBB-*- NO
Norske Skogsindustrier 20-Oct-06 S&P BBB-*- BBB- NO
Norske Skogsindustrier 8-Apr-04 S&P BBB-*- BBB*- NO
Norske Skogsindustrier 18-Mar-04 S&P BBB*- BBB NO
Norske Skogsindustrier 25-Mar-03 S&P BBB BBB*- NO
Norske Skogsindustrier 5-Feb-03 S&P BBB*- BBB NO
Norske Skogsindustrier 12-Oct-01 S&P BBB NO
SAS 6-Nov-08 S&P B BB- NO
SAS 22-Jul-08 S&P BB- BB*- NO
SAS 30-Apr-08 S&P BB*- BB NO
SAS 4-Sep-07 S&P BB NO
Statoil 3-Aug-07 S&P AA- A+*+ NO
Statoil 18-Dec-06 S&P A+*+ A+ NO
Statoil 8-Nov-06 S&P A+ A NO
Statoil 19-Jun-01 S&P A AA-*- NO
Statoil 15-Nov-00 S&P AA-*- AA- NO
Statoil 15-Mar-00 S&P AA- AA NO
Statoil 2-Dec-98 S&P AA AA+ NO
Telenor 1-Aug-06 S&P BBB+ A- NO
Telenor 25-Sep-01 S&P A- A*- NO
Telenor 26-Jul-01 S&P A*- A NO
Telenor 16-Jan-01 S&P A AA*- NO
Telenor 3-Apr-00 S&P AA*- AA+*- NO
Telenor 20-Jan-99 S&P AA+*- AA+ NO
Yara International 4-Oct-07 S&P BBB BBB+*-
Yara International 25-May-07 S&P BBB+*- BBB+
Yara International 20-Dec-05 S&P BBB+ BBB
Yara International 30-Nov-04 S&P BBB
PGS 10-Jul-06 S&P BB- B+*
PGS 31-Mar-06 S&P B+* B+
PGS 6-May-05 S&P B+
PGS/Old 12-Nov-03 S&P NR D
PGS/Old 30-Jul-03 S&P D CC*-
PGS/Old 30-Dec-02 S&P CC*- CCC+
PGS/Old 20-Nov-02 S&P CCC+ B
PGS/Old 29-Oct-02 S&P B BB-*
PGS/Old 31-Jul-02 S&P BB- BBB-*-
PGS/Old 3-May-02 S&P BBB-*- BBB-
PGS/Old 19-Jan-01 S&P BBB- BBB
Ocean Rig 19-Jun-08 S&P NR B
Ocean Rig 23-May-08 S&P B B*+
Ocean Rig 23-Apr-08 S&P B*+ B
Ocean Rig 29-Feb-08 S&P B B-
Ocean Rig 15-Jun-05 S&P B- CCC*+
Ocean Rig 11-May-05 S&P CCC*+ CCC
Ocean Rig 15-May-01 S&P CCC* CCC*-
Ocean Rig 1-Mar-01 S&P CCC*- CCC*
Ocean Rig 9-Jun-00 S&P CCC* CCC*-
Ocean Rig 15-Jul-99 S&P CCC*-
Statkraft AS 3-Oct-06 S&P BBB+
Songa Offshore SE 27-Jan-10 S&P B+
DNO International 16-Jun-04 S&P NR B
DNO International 31-Oct-03 S&P B
The historical changes in Firm credit ratings 1998 - 2008
 
Table 11 Historcial changes in credit ratings of Norwegian firms. The last three firms, Songa Offshore SE and 
DNO International are domestic firms. Source: Bloomberg 
Page | 78  
 
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Anderson, R.C., Reeb, D.M, 2003, “Founding-family ownership, corporate diversification, 
and firm leverage”, Journal of Law and Economics 46, pp 653 – 684 
Antazoulatos, A.A, 2000, “On the determinants and resilience of bond flows to LDCs, 1990 – 
1995”, Journal of International Money and Finance 19, pp 399 – 418  
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D.W, LaFond, R., 2006, “the effects of corporate governance 
on firms’ credit ratings, Journal of Accounting and Economics 42, pp 203 – 243 
Bertrand, M., Mullainathan S., 2003, “Enjoying the Quiet Life ? Corporate Governance and 
Managerial Preferences”, Journal of Political Economy 111, pp 1043 – 1075 
Bhojraj, S., Sengupta, P., 2003, “Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: 
the role of institutional investors and outside directors”, Journal of Business 76, pp 455 – 475 
Billett, M.T, King T.D, Mauer, D.C, 2004, “Bondholder wealth effects in Mergers and 
Acquisitions: New Evidence from 1980s and 1990s”, Journal of Finance 59, pp 107 – 135 
Boubakri, N., Ghouma, H., 2010, “Control/ownership structure, creditor rights protection, and 
the cost of debt financing: International evidence”, Journal of Banking & Finance, In press 
Bårdsen, G., Klovland, J.T, 2000, ”Shaken or Stirred? Financial deregulation and the 
monetary transmission mechanism in Norway”, Scandinavian journal of Economics 102, pp 
563 – 583 
Dyck, A., Zingales, L., 2004, “Private benefits of control: An international Comparison”, 
Journal of Finance 59, pp 537 – 600 
Elliott, W.B, Huffmann, S.P, Makar, S.D, 2003,”Foreign-denominated debt and foreign 
currency derivatives: complements or substitutes in hedging foreign currency risk?”, Journal 
of Multinational Financial Management 13, pp 123 – 139 
Fama, E.F., 1980, “Agency Problems and the Theory of the firm”, Journal of Political 
Economy 88, pp 288 - 307  
Page | 79  
 
Garvey, G.T, Hanka, G., 1999, “Capital structure and corporate control: The effect of 
antitakeover statutes on firm leverage 54”, Journal of Finance pp 519 – 546 
Gerdup, Karsten G., 2004, “Three booms and busts involving banking crisis in Norway since 
the 1980s”, Chapter 5 – Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway 1819 - 2003, Norges Bank, 
Oslo 
Gozzi, J.C., Levine, R., Schmuckler, S.L, 2010, “Patterns of international capital raisings”,   
Journal of International Economics 80, pp 45 – 57 
Hanneson, R., 1998, “Petroleum Economics: Issues and strategies of oil and natural gas 
production”, Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books. 
Jensen, M.C., Ruback, R.S, 1983, “The market for corporate control: the scientific evidence”, 
Journal of Financial Economics 11, pp 5 – 50 
Jiambalvo, J., 2001, “Capital Budgeting decisions”, Chapter 7 – Mangerial Accounting, John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.  
Kedia, S., Mozumdar, A., 2003, “Foreign currency-denominated debt: An empirical 
examination”, Journal of Business 76, pp 521 – 546 
Klovland, J.T, 2004, “Bond markets and bond yields in Norway 1820 – 2003”, Chapter 4 – 
Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway 1819 – 2003, Norges Bank, Oslo 
Krigman, L., Shaw, W.H., Womack, K.L., 2001, “Why do firms switch underwriters? ”, 
Journal of Financial Economics 60, pp 245 – 284 
Lay, K.G, 1994, “Mobilizing Private Savings for development: IBRD and the capital 
markets”, World Bank. 
Merton, R.C, 1987, “A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete 
information”, Journal of Finance 42, pp 483 – 510 
Min, H., Lee, Nam, N., Park, Nam,S. 2003, “Determinants of emerging-market bond spreads: 
Cross-country evidence”, Global Finance Journal 3, pp 271 – 286 
Page | 80  
 
Puthenpurackel, J., 2001, “the rationale and impact of global bond offerings”, working paper, 
Texas A&M University, College station, TX 
Qiu, J., Yu, F., 2009, “The market for corporate control and the cost of debt”, Journal of 
Financial Economics 93, pp 505 – 524 
Subramanyam, K.R, Wild, J.J., 2009, “Financial Statement Analysis”, tenth international 
edition, McGraw Hill 
Sundaresan, S.M, 2002, “Fixed Income Markets and Their Derivatives”, 2
nd
 edition only for 
sale in People’s Republic of China, South-Western 
Tawatnuntachai, O., Yaman, D., 2008, “Why do firms issue global bonds?”, Journal of 
Managerial Finance 34, pp 23 – 40 
Warga, A., Welch, I., 1993, “Bondholder losses in leveraged buyouts”, The review of 
Financial Studies 6, pp 959 – 982 










- Lov om Vannfall og bergverk, Chapter 1 §1 
- Lov om undersjøiske naturforekomster 
 




Oslo Stock Exchange  
- Oslobors.no 
- Osloabm.no  
Page | 81  
 
9.2 SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL DATA INPUT 
Amadeus 2.0 
“Børsprojektet” at Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, NHH 
 







WRDS Compustat (Financial Statements) 
http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
 
 
 
